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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study is to explore the role of NGOs in land reform and post-settlement 
support in the Albany district of the Eastern Cape using a qualitative case study of 
Masifunde. To discover this role, civil society, land beneficiaries, Department of Agriculture 
and Department of Rural Development and Land Reform were proved to have interwoven 
relationships. The interactions and relationships between these entities underpinned their 
perceptions of each other.  
This study is set against the backdrop of a weakening land reform program due to frequent 
policy changes.   Evidence presented showed how out of sync land reform is with its original 
mandate whilst civil society organisations have remained firmly rooted by theirs. The 
inability to have twin perspectives on this matter diverges the direction civil society and 
institutions involved in land reform take on. This separation in direction demonstrates the 
need for engagement between government and civil society in an attempt to assist in areas 
government is unable to reach or address.  
This thesis contends that there is definitely a role that NGOs do play and need to take on 
when it is evident that relevant actors are unable to deliver. Themes emerging from 
interviews necessitate civil society and government departments to combine their resources 
so as to maximise the impact for desired outcomes. These are views of both civil society and 
government, demonstrating that NGOs indeed do play a role in land reform and post-
settlement support and need to continuously do so in an attempt to cushion the blows of 
uneven implementation of land reform policies.      
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Introduction 
The infamous Natives Land Act of 1913 established the reserves for the black population, 
restricting them to a minor percentage of the land. The result of this Act was the 
concentration of land in white ownership and unsurprisingly, the South African landscape has 
not changed much. Despite small successes this harsh reality demonstrates the ineffectiveness 
of the land reform process as a whole. Policies in this program have shifted a number of times 
in direction though still failing to change skewed ownership of land, therefore unable to 
address the core issue. Within its limited scope, non-governmental organisations as forming 
part of civil society are unable to change the policies themselves and cannot wait on 
government to one day realize their mismatch of policies with what should be addressing the 
land question. Therefore non-governmental organisations insert themselves in small cracks 
appearing in the inadequate policies, making small changes bit by bit. The power they 
possess is their link to the people on the ground who bear the brunt of being pushed aside 
whilst serve government serves to work in the interest of neo-liberal policies. In the same 
view as Holloway (2002) they are changing the world without taking power. Changing the 
worlds of the faceless population in small increments without seeking to take power but 
perhaps influence policy change. 
The purpose of this study is to contribute to knowledge on land reform as a whole but more 
specifically the processes of the policies in land reform and how they impact on (or lack 
thereof) land claimants and beneficiaries. Consequently it provides an overview of 
problematic aspects of these policies or their implementation. The issue of ill-fitting and 
subsequently irrelevant policies resulting in disastrous and uneven outcomes is what 
necessitates non-governmental organisations to take part in processes of land reform such as 
post-settlement support. This is the motivation reinforcing the need to engage the non-
governmental organisations and appropriate institutions. Through engagement, the deficit 
would be identified and addressed accordingly. By understanding the web of relations 
between the relevant two departments, Department of Agriculture and Department of Rural 
Development and Land Reform (DRDLR) with the non-governmental organisation allows for 
the organisation to position itself within the different functions, adopting its own mandate in 
an attempt to fill the gap identified. Overall, the aim is to isolate the insufficiencies of these 
policies and how non-governmental organisations as belonging in civil sphere take on the 
role of protector of the population involved in land reform.  
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In order to find out what is the role, if any and better understand the role of NGOs in land 
reform post-settlement support, this study will answer the following research questions:  
1) What is the nature of the relationship between the Department of Agriculture and 
DRDLR with NGOs? 
2) What are the perceptions of each other and to discover what informs these 
perceptions? 
3)  To explore to what extent can NGOs involve themselves in processes of land reform 
including post-settlement support. 
4) What land reform practices enable or require NGOs to play a part? What needs are 
they attending to? 
 
Chapter 1 is a discussion of the history of dispossession in South Africa in terms of land, it 
seeks to contextualize and provide background for unfolding research study. It provides an 
introductory explanation of the pillars found within land reform. Each pillar is explained 
along with its aims. Post- settlement is support is introduced and so are the challenges within 
the programme. Additionally, NGOs and civil society are briefly outlined. Motivation for this 
study is provided and so is a description of the goals of the research and how it will be 
undertaken.  
Chapter 2 reviews prevailing literature on civil society by highlighting problematic 
definitions of civil society, especially across time and space. The tendency of equating civil 
society to democratic ideals is shown to be too simplistic and the need to define it within an 
African context is suggested. In terms of NGOs; the three perspectives are outlined and its 
position with regards to the state is discussed. Any influences experienced by the NGOs from 
the state and its constituents are provided. Ways in which the donor and NGO interact or 
relate are analysed thereby providing insight to the existing power relations.  
In the following chapter; the reasons behind the creation of Land Reform is given. The three 
pillars found in the programme are explained including a detailed account of the Distribution 
policies. Within Land Reform; the problematic aspects are provided and shown to be legacies 
inherited from the previous government. Additionally, the processes within post-settlement 
and the actors involved are displayed to have contradictory views which makes the 
implementation of post-settlement support difficult.  
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Chapter 4 is an outline of the history of organisations (National Land Committee and Border 
Rural Committee) involved in land struggles in South Africa dating from forced removals in 
the 1980s to those in Johannesburg recently. The background information of each 
organisation shows the difficulty they find themselves in due to their relationships with 
various actors such as the state and constituents. Their relationships are presented as intricate 
which provides reason for the short life span of some of the organisations.  
Chapter 5 is dedicated to research design& methodology where limitations, delimitations, 
significance of study, data collection methods and analysis are found. The study’s 
philosophical foundation is explained and the usage of qualitative research methods is 
justified. In terms of data collection; the type of interviews and challenges experienced during 
are made known as well as any weaknesses and strengths of this study. 
Chapter 6 reports on the findings. Results of the study are shown to be contrary to the 
literature used. The role played by Masifunde which would be wider is demonstrated to be 
impeded by existing challenges in the Land Reform programme. In order to achieve 
sustainable results it is shown that partnerships are required however, the entities are not 
doing so. Organisations just like Masifunde prove that they continuously play a role as they 
are able to engage with rural communities whilst capacitating land beneficiaries in ways 
which empowers them to better their livelihoods. 
The final chapter draws together important results that the work Masifunde undertakes is 
largely affected by the incapability of relevant departments such as Department of 
Agriculture and DRDLR. It is a provision of recommendations for future research. This is 
inclusive of studies across two different time periods such as an in-depth comparative 
analysis that uses focus groups as forms of data collection.   
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CHAPTER 1 
The context of the Research   
South Africa is a country whose history in terms of land is defined by social injustice by 
dispossession. This dispossession happened through the alienation and marginalisation of 
black people from land. These were the processes under the previous government, pre-
Apartheid and during.  However, with the advent of democracy in 1994, the newly elected 
government sought to redress these past injustices. Redress which was stipulated later in the 
Bill of Rights found in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. Hence the 
introduction of the Land Reform Programme.   
Land reform is therefore an attempt by the first democratically elected government to redress 
previous social injustices. The program is based on three separate but connected pillars: land 
restitution, land-tenure reform and land redistribution (Moseley& McCusker, 2008: 324).  
The first is concerned with compensation for land that was improperly seized; it covers 
forced removal which took place after 1913. Land- tenure is about tenure issues in communal 
areas including large parts of the former Bantustans whilst also seeking to protect the rights 
of tenants found on predominantly white owned farms. Lastly, redistribution is the transfer of 
land from white communities to black ones facilitated through a willing buyer-willing seller, 
market- based approach (Moseley& McCusker, 2008: 324). It provides the landless with land 
that is productive and residential (Kahn, 2007). However, masses of landless poor were and 
still are not benefitting from the land reform program. It “became evident in the late 1990s 
that the land redistribution program was plagued with problems of project collapse and idle 
land” (Aliber & Cousins; 2013:141).  
In this research project, out of the three pillars of the land reform program, land redistribution 
is the focus. Jacobs, Lahiff & Hall (2003) in Jaricha (2013:82) state that land reform seeks to 
alter the racial pattern of land ownership and access to land in South Africa. Land reform has 
been through many stages since its inception. The first policy, the Settlement  Land 
Acquisition Grant (SLAG) which was adopted from 1995 to 1999, was to enable poor 
households to purchase land through grants of R16 000. The high price of land, as compared 
to the grants, required groups to pool together their grants so as to afford the land. What this 
led to was overcrowding which made it difficult for the new owners of this land to forge 
livelihoods from it. As Hall (2004: 215) suggests, the acquisition of land was not linked to 
people generating livelihoods from it. In pursuit of a new direction which would establish 
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black commercial farmers rather than creating sustainable livelihoods through the sale of 
surplus produce on local markets, Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) 
was launched (Andrews, 2007:205). It was originally designed for those with capital to 
invest. This new policy was a response to the critiques of SLAG. The amounts beneficiaries 
had to contribute increased to R400 000 which meant an abandonment of the poor.   
However, those with less capital were now able to “contribute in the form of sweat equity” to 
qualify (Hall, 2004:216).  
The Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy (PLAS) was introduced in 2006. Its main objectives 
were to accelerate the delivery of land and give government more flexibility. It is to “enable 
provincial land reform offices to acquire  land for which beneficiaries could  be identified 
after the fact, most or all of whom would be allocated land on a lease-to-purchase basis” 
(Aliber et al, 2013:27). This is in the hopes of maximising productivity on the land after 
resettlement but what is problematic about this is that there is expectancy for the lessee to 
demonstrate production and flexibility within those three to five years which is limiting to the 
lessee. 
Land redistribution beneficiaries, especially small scale, were and are in need of post-transfer 
support. This post-transfer support is defined as infrastructure, extension officers, access to 
input including credit and access to markets (Hall, 2004: 220). A proposed solution to this 
lack of support, was resorting to “expert knowledge” (Hebinck et al, 2011: 221). This “expert 
knowledge”, in the form of  private consultants, have ended up playing central roles in the 
land reform projects as a whole, including the task of designing business plans for 
beneficiaries. This is seen, for example, in Limpopo province where there still exist 
continuities with the past and gaps between conceptualization and implementation are 
commonplace: “Implementation is constrained by excessive centralization, lack of 
community empowerment and overreliance on consultants” (Binswanger-Mkhize et al, 
2009:208).  This is despite the fact that the then Limpopo Department of Land Affairs (DLA) 
and now Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR) has introduced 
officials to assist beneficiaries (Moseley& McCusker, 2008: 332). However, results are still 
uneven. Failed reform projects with the assistance of extension officers are not unheard of 
due to the complexity engendered by the constantly changing policies over the years 
(Cousins, 2013: 5). This is partly a result of unrealistic assumptions about the skills and 
expertise of government officials.  
6 
 
In addition, there was a failure from the then DLAs’ side to effectively co-ordinate its 
programs with those of provincial departments of agriculture as well as other relevant ones 
such as human settlements or water affairs. Jacobs (2003) in Bingswanger-Mkhize (2009: 
209) mentions how there is a need to conceptualize land reform beyond the land transfer 
stage.  Those responsible for land reform and state services to farmers are not in sync. Both 
departments, the Department of Land Affairs and the Department of Agriculture don’t seem 
to have capacity, competence and will power to effectively drive the land reform program in 
a conclusive manner. In-fighting and finger pointing is not rare (Helliker& Murisa, 2011:64). 
Lack of co-ordination between those meant to supply post-settlement support services and 
those responsible for land reform means that the Land Reform Program’s progress is slow in 
meeting its objectives. The objectives are equity (in terms of land access and ownership) and 
efficiency with regards to improved land use whilst simultaneously contributing to the 
development of the rural economy (Binswanger-Mkhize 2009: 171). This slow 
implementation from the government has left many farmers or claimants struggling due to 
lack of information or simple awareness of existing policies that affect them. In order to 
address the problems outlined above, community, organisations such as the Border Rural 
Committee (BRC) and Masifunde Education and Development Project Trust, have developed 
relationships with claimant communities and are attempting to assist them to realise their 
constitutional rights in terms of land reform. These organisations work broadly within the 
civil society context whilst engaging with government as a means to compensate for the lack 
of impact caused by the problems outlined above. Masifunde in particular assists 
communities in the acquisition of land with the settlement of land restitution claims. Most 
importantly, they build alliances and partnerships with government and civil society 
organisations involved in land struggles for the advancement of the needs of the landless 
people and small-scale farmers, (Masifunde Education and Development Project Trust, 
2014). 
In order to discuss NGOs and their part in land reform, the concept of civil society needs to 
be briefly outlined. Civil society is defined by Hollands et al (1998:184), as those forms of 
society which constitute themselves between the private sphere and the state in order to 
represent special interests or opinions which are served inadequately or not at all by the 
public sphere. NGOs, an important part of civil society, refer to organisations which forge 
links between beneficiaries and often remote levels of government, donor and financial 
institutions (Helliker, 2013:318).  In Binswanger-Mkhize et al (2009:185) it is shown that 
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there has been a major reduction in state services to farmers in the past two decades. Even 
when there are services supplied by the provincial government and a few non-NGOs, only a 
minority of projects are reached. A study conducted by Hall in the Eastern Cape found that 
out of nine LRAD projects, most had not been in contact with the DLA having since obtained 
land and only two out of that nine had received infrastructural grants whilst none had been 
given the service of an extension officer (in Binswanger-Mkhize, 2009: 185). Without the 
assistance of community organisations such as Masifunde or BRC, many of these claimant 
communities would be left to the slow, inefficient and bureaucratic bungling of state land 
reform institutions. 
Six years ago Andrews (2007:218) stated that the existing land reform and related policies 
will not even meet their own targets, let alone address the legacy of apartheid and land 
hunger and extreme poverty. NGOs function in this context to assist in these targets being 
met. Whereas Andrews (2007) believes that an organised movement is needed to drive policy 
reformulation; I am of the view that this movement should also assist in the implementation 
of that policy. The assistance from this movement (which would be a group of NGOs) would 
also strengthen the voice of the rural poor so that they may clearly articulate their problems 
and challenges at local level and perhaps begin to pose alternative options for addressing the 
challenges that confront them. Hendricks and Ntsebeza (2011: 224) state that South African 
land reform is inordinately slow; there is very little concurrences on the reasons for this lack 
of progress or on mechanisms for speeding up the process. The policy itself is coherent but 
the way in which it has been implemented is inadequate, whilst others suggest that there exist 
structures and policy problems inhibiting objectives of land reform. I agree with Hendricks 
and Ntsebeza (2011: 225) that both policies and structures in place prevent the progress of 
this reform. This is where non-governmental organisations (NGOs) come in.  
Motivation for this study is that an engagement between government and civil society needs 
to take place so as to assist in areas government is unable to reach or address. Moyo (1999) in 
Mngxitama (2006: 60) states that the involvement of NGOs in land issues in Southern Africa 
is limited. This thesis will contribute to the prevailing literature in filling in the gap where 
there is a need to explore why there has been a limitation and how these organisations can 
intervene after three failed policies. 
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The goals of the research 
My main goal is to explore the role of the Masifunde non-governmental organisation in land 
reform and post-settlement support in the Albany district of the Eastern Cape. 
 
 
 
Related sub-goals are: 
 Exploring the nature of the relationship between civil society organisations such as 
Masifunde and the Department of Rural Development and Land Affairs;  
 Exploring the perceptions of land reform claimants, Masifunde staff and the staff of 
the DRDLA with regard to the role of NGOs in the implementation of land reform in South 
Africa. 
 
Field research will be conducted with DRDLA officials, Masifunde staff and land reform 
claimants working with Masifunde in the Albany District of the Eastern Cape. The proposed 
study will make use of qualitative research methods .Semi-structured in-depth interviews 
(Moseley& McCusker, 2008: 326) in one-on -one settings will be used to further understand 
the themes that arise.   
The sampling frame (Babbie &Mouton, 2007: 199) would be claimants who have been 
assisted by NGOs, Masifunde staff and DRDLA officials in the Eastern Cape. In an attempt 
to ensure representation of my sample, the claimants will be chosen according to 
characteristics or variables that will result in stratification (Babbie &Mouton, 2007:206).The 
intended time line (Tracy, 2013:102) for this research is six months.  
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History of dispossession 
The arrival of white settlers in the Cape resulted in the displacement of natives1.The settling 
in of Jan van Riebeeck resulted in the Khoi being placed between the Salt River and the fresh 
river Liesbeek. Only those prepared to work for the settlers were allowed to remain (Platzky 
&Walker, 1985:71).  The displacement of people took place again, three hundred years later, 
but on a larger scale and under different mechanisms.  
From the era of van Riebeeck, the foundation was set for what would later be dispossession 
and displacement of the blacks by the whites. Gradually, with every act put into place the 
“blacks were displaced into ever smaller and poorer patches of land” (Platzky & Walker, 
1985: 72). There was a need from the whites to sever ties with land that belonged to blacks. It 
is estimated that 3.5 million people were forcibly removed in South Africa during the 1950s 
and 1960s, not taking into account the unknown number of displacements from centuries ago 
(Platzky &Walker, 1985:9).  
 General Jan Smuts and the authorities felt the need to curb the productive farming rate of 
Africans. Africans residing on white farms with titles to private locations had small pieces of 
land which enabled some form of economic independence (Platzky& Walker, 1985:75). In 
1894, the Glen Grey Act was made law. It established individual land holdings over 
communal land tenure and created a labour tax so as to force Xhosa men into employment on 
commercial farms or in industry. It operated on a basic premise: ‘one man one lot’ (Bundy, 
1979: 135) in order to remove any hope of competition between white farmers and black 
locals. At the same time, according to Platzky and Walker (1985:76), it would limit the power 
of hereditary chiefs but also encourage the growth of a limited class of African smallholders. 
In essence, black land holders were being given a chance to become local producers. Failure 
to become such a producer would result in a labour tax by proletarianizing them; which was 
later dropped by 1905. This Act, according to Mnxgitama (2012: 8), was the main measure of 
dispossession prior to the Land Act of 1913.  However, in Bundy (1979:133) there are reports 
that following the 1894 act, the Transkei showed distinct elements of success. After all, 
agriculture declined in the Transkei only after 1930. There were uneven results demonstrating 
                                                          
1 Natives refers to black people prior to 1910 in South Africa. Africans and Blacks will be used interchangeably 
to refer to black people after 1910. 
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the differentiated impact the Glen Grey Act had on Africans. The Act made the distinction 
between successful black farmers and those less successful highly visible. 
The 1913 Natives Land Act is seen to be the most important form of legislation that finally 
dispossessed black people of their land and cemented the establishment of the reserves.  The 
only connection Africans would have with land would be through labour.  Bundy (1979:240) 
notes how the motive behind the act was to reduce competition and argues, more specifically, 
that it sought to preserve  an underdeveloped peasantry whose access to land would be 
confined while simultaneously preserving low-level peasant production. Within these 
separate land formations, poverty was rife. Accompanying social ills such as increase in 
crime, prostitution, malnutrition and infant death were widespread due to overcrowding and 
underdevelopment. All in all, people forced into the reserves also known as Bantustans 
(Nauta, 2004: 80) were struggling to work the already deteriorating land since all fully bodied 
individuals were contracted into employment. This in turn meant that it was the elderly and 
sick who were left with young children. The black people were taken off land belonging to 
them and turned into menial labourers. If one was not fit enough, one was forced to live in 
unbearable conditions.  
In the 1930s and 1940s, another form of displacement known as ‘betterment planning’ was 
introduced. It further pushed the black majority into the smallest percentage of land. Under 
betterment, tribal areas were divided into residential and agricultural land, with people living 
further away from the fields. It was an attempt to control land usage and thus improve and 
rationalise reserve agriculture (Platzky &Walker, 1985; x). This, it seems, was highly 
questionable since squeezing the same piece of land to capacity would not simply yield better 
farming results. Firstly, the Africans were driven off their land, and now the little relationship 
they had with land was being tightly controlled and regulated.  
So far, it can be said that these polices ensured segregation between the races. Under colonial 
administration it was referred to as segregation, however, in 1948 came the formalization of 
Apartheid. With the victory of the National Party in 1948, the party’s racist principle became 
more than that, it was put effectively into law. It was means to control and reduce the black 
threat in the industry and agriculture. Indeed, Bundy describes apartheid as a “mechanism 
specific to South Africa in [the] period of secondary industrialization, of maintaining a high 
rate of capitalist exploitation through a system which guarantees a cheap and controlled 
labour force, under circumstances in which the condition of reproduction (the distributive 
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African economy in the Reserves) of that labour force is disintegrating” (Bundy, 1979:227). 
Essentially, apartheid warranted the exponential growth of white capitalistic ventures in the 
country at the expense of the black nation. As the black population was moulded to generate 
and maintain production of these capitalistic projects, their lives as peasants or anything more 
than labourers were disqualified. As the second wave of industrialization increased, the 
disintegration of blacks as farmers took place.  
Now that black people were foreigners in their own country (Nauta, 2004: 80), their links to 
land were easily ripped. Ownership comfortably in the concentrated hands of the whites is an 
issue that remains unattended, more so following the inauguration of the new democratic 
state. It is unacceptable that just over a century after the Land Act millions of black South 
Africans are landless.    
Within the current South African political and economic landscape, there is an urgent need to 
address the legacies of laws and acts such as the 1913 Land Act. Laws which mostly affect 
the rural poor result in the landlessness of millions. The onus is on the state to redress the 
landlessness but with their poor performance thus far, it is up to civil society to step in.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
Civil Society 
This chapter highlights the problems associated with definitions of civil society. It does so by 
demonstrating that civil society is relative to time and space. The constant association of civil 
society with democratic ideals is shown to be too narrow. This chapter also suggests the need 
to define civil society within an African context, free from international imports. Moving on 
to NGOs, the three NGO perspectives will be outlined. The representational claim will be 
discussed with reasons as to why it cannot be easily accepted. As such, the NGO position 
regarding the state will be analysed. The tug of war between the state and NGO constituents 
which influence the characteristics of the NGO will be discussed. Internal conflicts 
displaying power relations and NGO/donor nexus will also be provided.  
Civil society as a notion is porous, it seeps into other spheres, making it more difficult to 
accurately define. It cannot be perceived in the same manner throughout different time 
periods, meaning that its parameters are subject to change. An example of this would be the 
different definitions or concepts of civil society within different states during colonialism and 
post-independence. This means, then, that notions of civil society vary and, as a result of time 
periods, are relative.   
Lewis (2002) in Nauta (2004:5) argues that there is a need to focus both on structure and 
process when analysing civil society. This is a necessity, it seems, since civil society is 
mutable. Focusing both on structure and process, we are able to identify what constitutes civil 
society and for what reasons such phenomena might be said to contribute to our calling it 
such. The benefit of constructing or drawing up parameters to my conception of civil society 
is functional insofar as it helps determine who falls within or outside these borders. A 
particular make up of civil society would also determine how it relates to other institutions, 
i.e. the state and the market. The structural make up of civil society permits for the exclusion 
or inclusion of specific social groups through explicitly strategically drawn up processes. It 
being a social construct further permits its fluidity and shift in structure. Mamdani (1996) and 
Chatterjee (2001) both show similar processes of civil society in different countries and how 
limited its applicability is. Mamdani (1996), for instance, explains how civil society excluded 
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blacks in South Africa as it was a realm based on race and only found within urban areas. The 
mere construct of civil society ensured the black population fell outside its circumference. 
Civil society within this context is made up of citizens (in this instance, they were white) who 
could be said to be right-bearing citizens according to the state. Black people were subjects 
who were subject to traditional rule in the Bantustans. Similarly, for Chatterjee (2001), civil 
society was an exclusive domain reserved for the elite in India whilst the poor remained in 
another domain forced to negotiate, perform and demand their rights to be recognised. Both 
of these civil society structures guarantee the exclusion of at least one social group. But due 
to the dynamics of civil society, this structure changes and shifts. This is why civil society is 
not an ahistorical static concept according to Nauta (2004:51).  
In post-colonial Africa where ‘democracy’ is practiced, the boundary lines of civil society 
have shifted significantly, allowing entry of a new social group. Civil society is no longer 
simply an exclusion based on race but, and so one ought to keep in mind that it is still an 
exclusive realm just with a different criteria. For both these thinkers, it is clear that civil 
society is a group of people who are considered citizens by the state whose rights are 
recognised. They need not perform or demonstrate for these rights to be awarded as opposed 
to those who find themselves on the outside of this domain known to be civil society.  
In Steytler et al (1998: 121) civil society is defined as an arena where manifold social 
movements and civic organisations from all classes attempt to constitute themselves in an 
ensemble of arrangements so that they can express themselves and advance their interests. 
This then shows a clear shift from the civil society spoken about by Mamdani and Chatterjee 
which then some might argue still is based on exclusion. For Steytler et al (1998: 121) it is 
about movements and forms of organisations that need these formations to easily express 
their interests. Mamdani (1996) sees it as an exclusive domain from pre Apartheid to post-
Apartheid with slight changes in appearance but still nonetheless exclusive. Whereas other 
scholars use it to define a space that is not the state or public sphere (Hollands & Ansell, 
1998:184). It has to be used within specific context. 
Mamdani (1996) speaks of the inapplicability of the notion of civil society, or rather, its 
limitation when looking at South Africa and most of the developing world. This limited 
applicability is also noted by Kasfir (1998: 17) where the notion of how civil society works in 
the Western democracies is being imported into Africa by scholars and donors. This poses a 
problem as the African context is being overlooked. In spite of the difference in context, a 
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continuation in the definition of civil society is found earlier, meditated by Marx in Melotti 
(1977:99). For Marx, civil society is seen as the only way through which the history of man 
may be understood. Broadly speaking, it is seen as the corporate bodies capable of freeing 
themselves, at least to some extent, from the dominant system. Civil society is also seen as 
capable of giving voice to an ideology of its own, which wishes to express the needs of a 
‘new’ system. Marx was also of the belief that without this civil society, modernisation could 
not take place. This definition is similar to that of Steytler et al (1998: 121) written years 
later. We may assume these corporate bodies to be like the organisations and social 
movements, which both need to express concerns or interests. The difference, however, is 
that Marx argues that these bodies need to be apart from the dominant system whereas 
Steytler et al suggest that such a separation is not a pre-requisite. We may then take this 
understanding to be related to the African context.       
Marx’s definition gives the impression that civil society results in modernisation. Clearly this 
too is not the case in South Africa unless we consider the white privileged population as a 
part of society that was able to bring about modernization. This may be the case in 
infrastructure development –clinics and schools in both urban and rural areas – regardless of 
the difference in quality. The restriction in his concept of civil society is similar to the view 
that from civil society or through its actions, democracy is born. Going back to the South 
African case, according to Mamdani (1996) civil society was the exclusive domain reserved 
for the white population. Since it did not bring about or advocate for democracy, although 
certain pockets of society at large, organisations or groups such as the United Democratic 
Front (UDF), applied pressure to the state and other various organs. Fast forward a few 
decades, only then is Marx’s idea of civil society fitting for South Africa.  
 
 This brings me to the discussion of democracy, since I argue that the association of civil 
society and democracy is too narrow and idealistic. Yet again, there has been an importation 
of how civil society should function from donors and scholars and this function is linked to 
the idea of democracy.  It is noted in Kasfir (1994: 5) that the existence of an active civil 
society is crucial to the vitality of political democracy. The implication being that without 
civil society, democracy cannot be achieved, ultimately equating civil society to democracy. 
This is clearly a reductionist view both of civil society and democracy which is problematic 
especially for newly independent African states or plainly African states. In other words, with 
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the existence of civil society it will be assumed that democracy will be reached easily. Now, 
once democracy is obtained, civil society may become obsolete, since it will have achieved 
its aims.  Not only is this a reductionist view but it is an assumed causal relationship between 
the two.  
 
2.1.1 Civil Society and Democracy  
The reductionist view of civil society to democracy makes civil society appear as a 
homogenous mass with no form of differentiation or any challenges when it comes to 
decision-making. There is an assumption that since civil society equates to democracy then 
organisations function within democratic ideals. Kasfir (1998: 13) demonstrates how naïve it 
this idea is. It implies that the demands of the organisations constituents are being expressed, 
and so the democracy achieved as a result will be in the interests of those same constituents. 
Contrarily, he argues that the type of democracy will be a middle class one since that is what 
these organisations are made of.  This view is unfortunately an import accompanying 
definitions of civil society and the perceived functions of it. Hence there is a need to define or 
analyse civil society within a specific African perspective, which is echoed by Fowler (2012: 
20). A case can be made, says Fowler, for an African ‘exceptionalism’ that should be factored 
into both the theory and method of measuring civil society. Additionally, that was what 
Mamdani (1996) and Chatterjee (2001) argued that the European construct of civil society 
has limited applicability to Africa and most of the developing world.  
Lastly, Hall (1995) too argues and finds it essential to stress that the “concept of civil society 
is not equivalent, as some would have it, to more familiar and valued notions.”  He further 
adds that we expect democracy to be married to civil practices which is why we value it.  
This is also another example of romantic ideals linked to civil society and its practices. What 
is considered democratic to a particular group within society may not necessarily be so to 
another. Hall (1995) illustrates this point with ethnic cleansing practices which may have 
been decided through democratic processes. Of course, the act itself is not democratic. Again 
one can think of Chatterjee (2001) and Mamdani (1996) who meditate on the exclusive nature 
of civil society and how it excludes others while bringing about democratic ideals. Right now 
South Africa is considered a democratic state with an active civil sphere both in terms of 
organisations and Mamdani’s notion yet it too is restrictive to certain social groups who are 
not allowed or unable to benefit from these democratic ideals.  
16 
 
2.1.2 Civil Society and the State 
Now, closely related to that democracy is the state. Civil society and the state must interact in 
some form or another in order for democracy to take off as suggested above by some 
scholars. Even for some like Kasfir (1998) and Hall (1995) who are not of this argument, at 
some point these two actors need to interact. The state and civil society cannot exist in 
isolation and independent of each other, which is why some may define civil society in 
relation to the state. In Kasfir (1998: 4) civil society is narrowly defined as including all kinds 
of public non-state activity, but only when the members of civil society are challenging the 
state. This is highly problematic if only because when we look at South Africa right now, we 
may ask, how many organisations fall outside the parameters of civil society? This definition 
is limited because it means it is the social space in which both dominated and dominant social 
groups oppose the state. It forcibly creates sharp divisions between the state and these social 
groups without taking in consideration the overlapping that may occur. Some individuals 
belonging to a dominant or dominated social group might be also found within state positions 
that would make it difficult for them to confront the state, which, according to this definition, 
is essential in order to be defined as civil society. Additionally, what does challenging the 
state mean? It could range from a protest or a petition to burning of state buildings. So, this 
notion of civil society should be broader, and instead of social groups that oppose the state, it 
should include those who interact and intersect with the state. This is known as the corporatist 
model of civil society which will be explained. 
Furthermore, the overlapping of the state and the sphere of civil society is commonly 
overlooked as civil society is essentialised Kasfir (1998: 10). Civil society should actually be 
described as relative, as these two actors at some point must interact and intersect as 
mentioned previously. This relative autonomy is also mentioned by Hollands & Ansell (1998: 
126). What this concept does is assume that if civil society organisations are not against or in 
confrontation with the state then they are not for any type of change that is in the interests of 
the constituents which they represent. If we agree then that civil society needs to be 
confrontational with the state, it is able to be defined as such. Their relations are not of equal 
capacity as, the state is both an actor and regulator of this relationship. So ultimately, their 
interactions are on the state’s terms, and then from that it will decide whether to give in to 
these organisations’ demands, Kasfir (1998: 135) “the state both frames civil society and 
occupies space within it”. All in all, it is up to the state to recognise or acknowledge that any 
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form of civil society exits, for the domain known as civil society would not exist without any 
state as it would have no actor onto which to exert pressure.  
Having said that the state and civil society are intertwined, the interwoven nature of their 
relationship brings us to outline civil society in a contrasting manner to the state. Despite the 
variations in the concept of what civil society is and the changes it may undergo, what 
remains constant is its contrast to the state. So with whatever notion of civil society, it is still 
pivotal to the state therefore hinging on the subject-object dichotomy mentioned in Helliker 
(2006: 69). In Hollands & Ansell (1998: 122) it is noted how there are two conceptions of the 
relationship civil society has with the state being corporatist and voluntary-pluralist. 
Voluntary-pluralist adopts an anti-statist position. In a South African context it is highly 
applicable as the organs of civil society, civil society as defined by Hollands & Ansell (1998: 
121) were initially in conflict with the state during Apartheid and were clearly apart from the 
state. This, we may say, was in order to work towards the interests and demands of those they 
represent. Yet, post-Apartheid with a democratized state they are congruent with the state. 
They have been incorporated into decision-making although this is not the case at all times. 
The second position being corporatist is a description of what our civil society landscape 
looks like currently, where these civil society groups are incorporated into decision-making, 
as the name suggests. 
In this corporatist model there is the hope, or rather the assumption, that the state is neutral in 
its decision-making or interactions, as a mediator in general. We are also unable to assume 
that these groups or sectors are democratic in their own meetings. I have already noted that 
civil society organisations do not necessarily contribute to a democratic state, and that they 
also are not necessarily democratic in character. It is expected of these sector to be wholly 
working in the interests of their constituents which we assume are consulted and engaged in a 
manner that is devoid of any hierarchy or discrimination. Within this whole, the state yet 
again is a player and regulator. This shows how powerful the state actually is. However, 
because it chooses to be in dialogue and recognise these sectors, we may mistakenly overlook 
this. It is linked to what was mentioned previously about the unfair leverage the state has over 
all these organs of civil society.  Hollands & Ansell (1998: 128) mention that “those organs 
that are either marginal or out of favour with the state, can easily be excluded from the 
decision making process”, which suggests that in this model, the state gains social control in 
return for giving representation to such groups.  
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In Helliker (2006:81) it is noted that following a democratic transition, the strength of a civil 
society, and of NGOs in particular, lies not in opposing the state but co-operating with it.  
This is difficult to conceptualise since civil society is a player and regulator, and so the co-
operation will not be genuine as it does not begin on equal footing; since the essence of civil 
society is its challenging and confronting nature. What then happens when working alongside 
the state? The incorporation of these organs into state departments inevitably makes them 
weaker. Civil society then is unable to hold the state accountable as it is itself complicit. 
Perhaps, in the South African context, once the state is democratized, the demands become 
less pressing since democracy has already been obtained. The state then seems to be 
interested in the concerns of these organisations and sectors. As said already, there is no 
equality at all in this so there is no possibility of it being a balance from the state’s side which 
brings Gellner in Hall (1995: 15) to argue that the notion that groups should balance the state 
is subtly wrong.  
Earlier on in this chapter, I began with the concept of civil society according to Stephan in 
Hollands & Ansell (1998: 121) based on a domain consisting of social movements that 
arrange themselves in order to make their interests count. How this concept differs, or rather 
what is omitted, is with whom it expresses itself or against and for whom do they arrange 
themselves. It is devoid of the state.       
With the state not being able to be independent from civil society, it becomes impossible to 
define civil society without the state. This is why Stephan’s notion of civil society is 
incomplete as it does not mention at all to whom the civil society demands would be 
expressed. Civil society may be acting as a buffer between the public sphere and state. A 
cushion, so to speak, onto which pressures from both sides maybe exerted. Additionally, civil 
society may be seen as the mediator between the spheres. It is as though civil society is the 
umpire on the playing field with the state and all those found within the public sphere are the 
players. Not all these entities participate on the field in the same might. Some are indeed 
more than passive than others. Whatever action they may choose goes through the umpire 
who will act on their behalf. These civil society structures include non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs).    
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2.2.1 Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs)   
NGOs are defined by DeMars (2005:41) as firstly being in contrast to corporations and 
instead articulating  and claiming to serve a broad, public purpose based on universal human 
(or species) rights and needs. Additionally, they are said to not be self-serving in aims and 
related values, improving circumstances and prospects of disadvantaged people who are 
unable to realise their potential or achieve their full rights in society (Nauta, 2004: 49).  
DeMars’ (2005) basis for the contrast to corporations is that they are supposedly not in 
pursuit of private profit. The conclusion to that is narrow as it seems as though it has been 
forgotten that corporations  themselves are made up of people. NGOs are no different. They 
may have a mission-statement which promises to serve communities on the basis of universal 
human rights, but do the opposite. The distinction between NGOs and corporations seems to 
be insignificant. If indeed, corporations are in pursuit of profit. What then of NGOs in pursuit 
of donor money and funding. Just as corporations are in need of profits which keep them 
functioning, NGOs require donor money to continue existing. In addition, Nauta (2004: 50) 
discusses the degree to which an organisation is value-driven. The more value-driven it is, the 
more selfless and less self-serving it is. What should be questioned is whose values are used 
as a measuring stick. What criteria is used to establish these values which would steer an 
organisation. These questions may at first seem insignificant but just the fact that it is driven 
by values prescribed by a certain actor from elsewhere is problematic. This would mean 
imposing one’s values on whomever the NGO claims to serve selflessly.   
Another definition of NGOs that also includes profit as a description, which has been noted 
problematic, is that of Hollands & Ansell (1998: 186). For them, “NGOs in addition to their 
non-profit character, are required to demonstrate their accountability to a genuine 
constituency”. Hollands also adds that these constituencies are identified by some degree of 
need or marginalisation which the state cannot fully address. Apart from the supposed non-
profit nature of these organisations, the definition is somewhat satisfactory. A more 
developed notion of NGOs is that by Helliker (2013: 318) which refers to non-membership 
intermediary NGOs. These forge links between the beneficiaries of their work, namely 
communities and community organisations, and the often remote levels of government, 
donor, and financial institutions. There are, then, three identifiable schools of NGOs, namely 
Pluralist, Globalist and Realist (Nauta, 2004: 36).  
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2.2.2 Pluralist Perspective  
 The first school in my view is too romantic of a notion. Here, NGOs are seen to be acting 
largely against government. This is where the representative claim stems from, because these 
NGOs are portrayed in the school as “servants of the poor in grassroots development, or 
prophetic voices of the voiceless lobbying governments and the UN, or transnational pilgrims 
in an emancipatory passage from oppressive rule to self-regulating community” (Nauta, 
2004: 36). It implies that they tirelessly work on behalf of the people they represent and 
without their efforts, many would remain under oppressive rule since they, alone, would fail 
to articulate their demands and needs. What this type also does is steer clear of identifying 
issues with overlapping boundaries in terms of the identity of these organisations and against 
whom they are working, even if it is for instance, the government. It does not allow for 
blurred lines for these organisations, there is an assumption within a country or a specific 
society, the NGO is and will be in conflict with the state or other actors and there is no in-
between.  
 
2.2.3 Globalist Perspective  
The second perspective is the globalist perspective. It views NGOs as passive channels 
through which ideals are carried. Here, NGOS are a mere extension of states, multinational 
corporations. This means that there is no difference between those which function solely for 
profit, and those which fail to fully address the needs of its people or those who supposedly 
work selflessly for their constituents. In Nauta (2004: 37) “globalism portrays NGOs as rather 
passively implementing and enforcing the global norms that emanate from UN organs and 
multilateral agreements”. What is shown also is that NGOs are in a way insignificant as they 
are unable to function on their own, relying on their own ideals whilst rejecting those brought 
on by other actors. In this view, NGOs influence or impact is also diminished because they 
are seen as passive and having no might with which to counter or genuinely act alongside 
their constituencies against the principles passed down by entities such as the UN. Nauta 
(2004: 38) states that the implication is that government and NGOs end up, together, 
constituting a kind of inchoate parliament.  With this form of assembly, NGOs accountability 
may be questioned, especially when they are a channel through which to carry other ideals. 
NGOs in this view are not entirely compatible with the above definition by DeMars (2005) 
that is, the organisations being unlike firms, and functioning on the basis of human rights 
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while being value-driven. According to this school, the values that drive NGOs are ultimately 
those of organs such as the UN which again raises the issue of someone else’s values being 
imposed on others. Finally, human rights have to be defined by these multinational 
corporations and states, not the NGOs themselves. The fact that those who represent and are 
represented are unable to qualify what human rights are, for example, is limiting – as the 
criteria would be suited to the interests and benefits of government representatives and 
institutions. 
 
2.2.4 Realist Perspective 
Similarly to globalism, realism is of the view that NGOs have an insignificant impact in 
society but for different reasons. For globalism this is due to international influence whilst for 
realists it is because they address issues that the state is not interested in. According to 
realism, NGOs cannot have the more power than the state. States are seen to be the most 
important actors on the world stage, DeMars (2005: 38). Ultimately, NGOs are rendered 
powerless when compared to states. If states are most important and have so much power 
then there would be no point in having NGOs since interaction with the state would not be an 
equal one, the state would always overshadow the NGO, the latter constantly surrendering 
itself.  
Having discussed the three schools of NGOs, Helliker’s (2013:318) definition is still fitting 
as there is no promise about the organisation working and serving anyone based on ideals or 
values that are prescribed by an institution or global force. Whereas DeMars’ (2005) notion 
suggests that they are not self-serving and Nauta (2004) that they improve their constituents’ 
circumstances. These are all ideal images drawn up of NGOs which overlook external 
influences and power relations. They need to take into account that these organisations, 
whilst serving the people, interact with other actors and therefore mould each other. Hearn 
(2007: 1101) touches on that, arguing that “NGOs, defined as intermediary organizations that 
are set up for public benefit, are just one set of actors within civil society” meaning that they 
do not exist in isolation whilst tirelessly working in the benefits of their constituents. One of 
the themes that arise when discussing NGOs is the representation claim the extent to which 
the claim true. Closely related to that is the issue of power relations within the organisation 
itself, and those with whom that it comes into. Finally, the controversy and ambiguity of their 
practice will also be discussed.  
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2.2.4 Representational Claim 
The representational claim implies that the organisation knows better than the people it 
represents. That only through ‘us’ will ‘you’ be empowered, and that ‘we’ are the vehicle of 
change, therefore, you need us.  Van Driel & van Haren (2003: 535) include the argument 
that NGOs are seen as suitable instruments for representing their interests due to the close 
relationship with the poor. What it additionally does is demonstrate that other actors such as 
the state and government are unable or rather choose not to represent the needs of these 
people. That is how these claims may clash with those of other actors. Representation means 
to speak on behalf of constituents or someone. It robs the one being represented of any 
agency. Due to this assumption of them not being able to speak for themselves, “The NGO 
acts not for itself, but to express the power of the grassroots against the elites, or to empower 
the grassroots” (Nauta, 2004: 25). This is ironically disempowering to those supposedly 
empowered through the expressions of NGOs. These NGOs are then synonymous with 
empowerment. Again this reiterates the insular conclusion that NGOs aim to selflessly serve 
others. Of course, this would mean representation as preferred by the representatives, i.e. the 
NGOs. When dealing with this representational claim, Holloway (2002) comes to mind. 
Holloway (2002) interestingly suggests that people ought to be proactive and not abdicate 
their agency. Instead they should act in whatever small but significant manner they can, since 
it is difficult to rely solely on third-party representation. Making it evident that he would be 
against the representational claim.  
By looking at the different schools of NGOs, it is clear that this claim should not just be 
accepted without question. In Nauta (2004: 42) it is stated that each NGO asserts a 
representational claim to serve the needs and rights of a particular population. Who is to say 
that this population is the organisation’s constituents? Through globalism, it is evident that 
NGOs may be insignificant when faced with global influences and therefore the claim to be 
representing a particular population holds no weight. Apart from being passive channels 
through which to carry global ideals, this representation may be manipulated in a way which 
benefits the institutions and government. Adding to that, having claimed to represent its 
people, the organisation may not even engage in activity which hopes to help realise 
potentials, since it is increasingly treated as businesses. In Uganda, for instance, it has 
become common to set up an NGO in order to make money (Hearn, 2007: 1102). How, then, 
is an organisation with the objective of generating income for its leaders genuinely fulfil its 
mandate. A director of a NGO in Uganda even admitted to first thinking of their own survival 
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and secondly about other people’s survival (Hearn, 2007: 1103). This allows for the 
conclusion that any form of representation from that organisation would not necessarily be to 
empower its constituents.     
 McSweeny (2014:277) captures another danger of representation, “the NGOs set themselves 
the task of speaking on behalf of a constituency with the consequence that local communities 
in receipt of NGO ‘help’ are reduced to  passive subjects rather than active agents”. This is 
linked to what I earlier discussed, that the notion that empowerment is possible only through 
the involvement of an NGO is in itself disempowering. It implies that the constituents are 
only capable of always receiving, being dependent on the organisation for some form of 
change in their lives. A situation where they are subject to what the NGO offers them. 
Without the NGOs, it seems, they would be complacent and unable to articulate their needs 
or rights. So then representation maybe equated to passiveness.  
Most literature on NGOs is positive and makes a compelling case that they are necessary to 
their constituents, improve said constituent’s circumstance while working with a human 
rights and value-laden foundation. This is especially the case following the introduction of 
the neoliberal policies which have adverse effects for people of Africa or Latin-America and 
basically what would be described as the ‘Third World’ or ‘developing World’. Policies such 
as structural adjustments, as well as ruthless African dictators, are some of the many ‘horrors’ 
that these parts of the world need to be saved from.  Juxtaposed to this is the idea of NGOs 
and the recolonization of Africa. Fowler in Hearn (2007: 1100) even goes as far as describing 
it as the “scramble for Africa”. In other words, the organisations rush to aid in the 
development of the continent, echoing the above notion of empowerment and lack of agency. 
It is a recolonization because as the settlers made Africa their home, bringing along their own 
ideology to which Africans had to adapt as it was more civilized or perhaps it made more 
sense to rather speak their language. So yet again, it makes sense to develop in a certain 
pathway which is dictated by them and obviously led by them. It is thinking that only through 
‘us’ will ‘you’ ever be developed, and that ‘we’ are saving you from yourselves, just as the 
missionaries had thought centuries ago. There is also a scramble in finding official aid 
agencies to fund and work with (Hearn, 2007: 1100). Once Western funding has been 
secured, it is easier to penetrate the continent in terms of ideals. These NGOs are the vessels 
through which this takes place. So if the establishment of these organisations, or funding 
local ones, is a way in which to recolonize, the external forces control various forms of 
development. It then means NGO agency is done away with, which enables us to conclude 
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that independence does not exist. The countries, then, might as well not have been declared 
independent as they are still under the control of the Northern actors. How, then, can NGOs 
claim to be representatives of their constituents if they are the face of those that fund them?  
Petrus in DeMars (2005: 23) critiques the NGO bloom in that their net effect is actually to 
disempower the constituents they claim to serve. This then makes their practice controversial 
and ambiguous.  
NGOs cannot be easily positioned as mere instruments of global donors as the paragraph 
above has suggested. It cannot also be assumed that they unproblematically support 
community organisation or rural movements in a democratic and progressive manner 
(Helliker, 2013: 318). There is debate as to whether NGOs are more loyal to the constituents 
which they claim to serve or to their donors. In whose interests do they actually work and 
how much of an influence do the donors play in the type of work they do? 
2.2.6 Donors and Funding 
What needs to be unpacked is the donor/NGO nexus. How what effect does the donor have 
on the NGO. What of strategies does it uses to achieve its goals as a result? Or is the 
organisation open to its own decisions in terms of activities, with room for autonomy given 
by the donors. Gordon and Berkovitch (2006) argue that not only does the donor determine 
what type of work is done but it makes up its very essence, since it shapes and moulds 
NGO’s critical perspective through funding. Funding is often used as that which determines 
what aspects of a government might be criticised. Meaning, then, that it is more accountable 
to the donors than its constituents as it is dependent on that external funding. This cancels out 
the previous notion of NGOs not being self-serving and working to help others realise since 
they tend to function like a corporate enterprise, always answering to stockholders (Gordon & 
Berkovitch, 2006: 2). This brings us back to the problematic point that they do not run like 
any profit driven organisation which many use to define what NGOs are. When dealing with 
NGOs, there is a tendency to view them, at face value, as separate entities (with donors on 
one side and activities and constituents on the other). They are treated as different and 
unrelated facets of the organisation whereas, in fact, they intersect and interpenetrate each 
other. What the constituents’ desire cannot be fulfilled wholeheartedly as the organisation is 
told what to do by an external almost invisible actor. Whilst the donor does not design its 
aims according to the needs and rights needed by the particular population.  
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The relationship between the donor and the organisation is an unequal one where the 
organisation is subdued by the donor. Due to this restrained position, that the NGO finds 
itself being instrumental to the donor and its interests. DeMars (2005:44) states that the 
relationship between NGOs and their partners is not one of dependency but that the NGOs 
are in fact constituted by their partners. This is also mentioned by Helliker (2013: 318), that 
NGOs possibly become used as instruments of global donors. As the organisations are there 
as mechanism through which to advance the donors’ interests, the interactions are then of 
unequal power relations, where dichotomies of North against the South, East versus West and 
Developed and underdeveloped may surface. These dichotomies, which frame the 
relationship and hence interactions, resemble which existed before, which is why authors 
such as Fowler in Hearn (2007) claim that the function of NGOs is the recolonization of 
Africa. This issue is also echoed by DeMars (2005:43) who mentions that international NGOs 
operate along a North-South axis whilst their headquarters are in the developed world, the 
capitalist democracies whose activities are to influence the Third world and former 
communist world. Here, the narrative of recolonization is framed in such a way that suggests 
that the NGOs are saving these worlds through democratic ideals, promoting knowledge and 
resources that will allow these populations to develop or flourish as prescribed by the First 
world. Ultimately, even the donor/NGO nexus demonstrates unequal power relations between 
Africa and the North or South.  
2.2.7. Internal Conflicts   
Colonization benefitted a few individuals, and that continues to be the case with the 
emergence of NGOs in Africa and elsewhere.  There are actors involved in such 
organisations, not genuinely, but as a money-making scheme. The combination of 
constituents needing representation and individuals who view NGOs as a means of income 
results in the heterogeneous population. Due to global inequalities, NGOs can be seen as a 
space to which to escape. While the attempt is to redress, there exists inequalities within these 
organisations themselves. These organisations in fact replicate inequalities and undemocratic 
processes found in society. Sacouman (2012: 913) points out that unfairness of salaried 
workers of the NGO asserting authority and proﬁting over those who are doing majority of 
the work was tied to general inequality in life.  
Additionally, these NGOs are run as businesses with the most powerful individual within a 
community or an educated non-local one is brought in to manage the organisation. Hearn 
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(2007: 1103), in an interview, discusses how NGOs are first a place of business, where they 
think of their own survival and then that of other’s. DeMars (2005:44) notes how in parts of 
Africa during the 1990s, internationally funded NGOs became the single largest source of 
middle-class jobs at a time when government bureaucracies were downsizing. Not only are 
there heavily vested interests of a Northern donor that shape the NGO, but the NGO itself is 
led by people who are representative of that particular population but are merely part of 
NGOs as professionals.  
This reality is a stark contrast to the intention of NGOs as they are defined in Sacouman 
(2012: 901)  as ‘‘an independent voluntary association of people acting together on a 
continuous basis, for some common purpose, other than achieving government ofﬁce, making 
money or illegal activities’’. The first issue is that there is no common purpose as they are 
brought together for different reasons; constituents and its leaders. Different meanings are 
attached to the organisation but most importantly, with the constituents losing out the most 
because the notion is that the NGO provides “solace for those facing global inequalities” 
(Sacouman, 2012: 901) yet those very same inequalities such as non-democratic decision 
making, and differentiated treatment, are found within the organisation. Hearn (2007) 
demonstrated how NGOs in Uganda are spaces which entrepreneurs are tapping into meaning 
then there are no common purposes and it exists merely as an association.  
2.2.8 NGOs and Democratic Ideals 
The undemocratic element in NGOs remains a prominent feature because its many 
manifestations have been naturalised over time. They are expected to solve problems in a 
democratic manner yet the organisation itself is not democratic and is actually riddled with 
hierarchical relations through which inequality is manifested. So this is paradoxical, where it 
is functioning beyond its scope. This makes their practice controversial and ambiguous. We 
have established that they are unable to fully represent their constituents as they have 
different ideals, especially those of the donors and those of the people they claim to represent. 
On top of that, organisations more often than not, operate within vertical networks and not 
the horizontal ones as proposed by most literature.  
Earlier on when dealing with civil society, the establishment of the narrow and restrictive 
perspective of equating and associating civil society with democracy was cleared. This is 
happening again where NGOs are presumed to be working within democratic lines. 
Contrastingly, inequality is ruled out because NGOs are painted as a safe haven against 
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inequalities, “For its proponents, NGOs promise to address today’s most pressing social 
problems in democratic and ‘‘practical’’ ways. From this perspective, it comes as little 
surprise that NGOs are often received so positively” (Sacouman, 2012: 901).  
It is evident that a more realistic definition is needed. One that is not romantically drawn up 
and blind to social influences more specifically global ones. Additionally it should include 
that it attempts to selflessly work in interests of others and tries to do away with 
heterogeneous constituents who don’t have so much of  purpose where entrepreneurs are 
entering this space for business purposes and others are seeking solace and reliant on it for 
some form of  representation.    
 
2.3 Autonomy and Independence from the state 
NGOs are likened to colonial missions in Africa, their autonomy is, arguably, questionable – 
not only from their western donors but from the state within which they operate. A clear 
discussion on the relationship between the state and NGOs is necessary.  
Previously when discussing civil society and its different relations with its varied actors, it 
was noted how they mould each other through each interaction. These interactions which are 
more frequent one would think, then demonstrate that civil society and the state and other 
actors cannot and do not exist in isolation. Their relations with each other is what defines 
them. Nauta (2004: 50) notes how although NGOs by definition are thought not to be part of 
the state, they are nevertheless meant to be part and parcel of the state because by doing so 
their relationship with the state is immediately constricted. This implies that neither state nor 
NGO is able to exist with each other. Of course, in rare cases, states may exist with a limited 
or no civil society or NGO present such as Somalia.  
Due to the fact that state and NGOs infiltrate each other, and as a result influence each other, 
what should be questioned are the relationship dynamics between the two parties, because the 
Western donor funded NGOs may appear to be merely instrumental when intersecting with 
the state. Again, the “state and civil society are mutually constituted rather than separate, 
autonomous entities” McSweeny   (2014:278). Here, hostility or perhaps productive 
partnerships with respects to service delivery, may arise. NGOs work to influence political, 
economic systems (Appe, 2010: 93) and from this, the state judges the influence an NGO has.  
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In some instances, the state’s capacity is made to appear as weak, as Chevrier notes (2006: 
342) in that development is possible only through NGOs. This immediately has a disabling 
effect on the idea of that specific state. This, coupled with the fear or scepticism of 
international donor interests, results in the state being suspiciousness of the NGO. Edwards 
and Hulme in McSweeny (2014: 277) argue that NGOs involved in service delivery risk 
undermining the capacity of the state.  
It has been popularly noted that only democratic states are welcoming of NGOs or that they 
provide a more enabling environment for NGOs operate. What needs to be established is 
exactly what role the NGOs are able to play in these states. NGOs may take on the part of 
service delivery provider or that of advocacy. In with some cases the lines between advocacy 
and administration are blurred. It is no surprise, then, that Gramsci argues for NGOs to go 
back to their roots and become advocates and not service providers (McSweeny, 2014: 278)  
because by doing that they are clearly able to challenge things like capitalistic development 
which may be negatively impacting on their constituents than just demanding provision of 
basic services . This demanding of basic services on behalf of a community was discussed as 
disempowering because they are now merely passive recipients while NGOs carry out the 
work. The very nature of NGOs (being representative of its people) is in itself what allows it 
to intervene for provision of services while at the same time “lead[ing] to challenges of state 
authority” (Brinkeroff, 1999: 129).  
Even in the form of partnerships and networks, NGOs may seem as limiting state capacity. 
These partnerships as defined by Brinkeroff (2002:21) as:  
encompassing mutual influence, with a careful balance between synergy and 
respective autonomy, which incorporates mutual respect, equal participation in 
decision-making, mutual accountability and transparency are seen as beneficial as 
they are able to promote more responsive, transparent and accountable government. 
The implication of this is that without partnerships, ultimately donor influence through the 
NGO, development would not be achieved in these states. According to Brinkeroff, (2002:20) 
not only is development only possible through partnerships but service provision are also 
only possible through such. In fact, partnerships are seen as the only appropriate approach. 
This demonstrates the point that the relations between NGOs and states vary from being 
conflictual to co-operational.  
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The state’s choice to include NGOs as operational could mean that the state is absolving itself 
of its responsibilities (McSweeny, 2014: 277). Having said that, partnerships and links cannot 
be viewed as possibly challenging state authority but should also be seen as offering these 
positions to NGOs in efforts to seem more efficient. It is also a case of not seeking absolute 
power or either state or NGO. The involvement of NGOs are seen as a necessity as the 
assumption is that policies and strategies run by the state or government would be less likely 
to fail in their goals. As previously mentioned, they are portrayed as instrumental in 
identifying and realistically representing the actual needs of those they represent. However, 
daily practices of NGOs differ as they are influenced by a multitude of factors. The state 
would therefore offer these partnership positions to NGOs for these reasons.   
 
This chapter has argued that the concept of civil society is relative, dependent on time and 
context. It has contextualised civil society as a space where groups and organisations are able 
to express themselves, whether aligned with the state or not. This is what the two models of 
civil society display. The notion of civil society being associated with democratic ideals was 
problematized due to its importation from the West. Therefore, the chapter highlighted the 
need to define civil society within the African context. The insignificance of the difference 
between NGOs and firms was also discussed. The representational claim of NGOs and the 
fact that they aim to selflessly serve others was shown to be unsatisfactory. Power relations 
found within the organisations themselves and between the donors was discussed. It proved 
that at times NGOs design their aims in accordance to the donors and not their constituents. 
The state and its interpenetrative relations makes it hard to hold accountable, more so when 
they are in a form of partnership. It results in the NGO adopting a middle of the road 
approach which is difficult, trying to hold the state accountable on behalf of its constituents 
whilst working with the state.      
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CHAPTER 3 
Land Reform 
In this chapter the reasons underpinning the creation of land reform are given first, followed 
by a brief explanation of the three pillars of the programme and a more detailed account of 
the three redistribution policies. The challenges present in the land reform programme are 
clear continuities inherited from the previous regime. These include the unrealistic 
expectations based on the Extension of Security of Tenure (ESTA) and its failure to prevent 
evictions, the problematic contradictory property clause in the constitution and the failure of 
restitution due to the increase in urban claims and tendency to favour the monetary 
compensation. Additionally, the notion of citizenship in restitution cases brings back 
decisions based on ethnicity, and further, the contradictory view of the departments involved 
in post- settlement with those of organisations are laid out.      
 
To begin with, it must be noted that the foundation for the formal implementation of land 
reform was laid in 1991 with the “repeal of the 1913 Land Act and 1936 Land Acts together 
with the 1945 Group Areas Act” (Lestoalo and Thupana, 2013:300). The attitude with which 
these took place can be said to have pre-empted the land reform programme adopted three 
years later. This is not forgetting that the retraction of these acts does not miraculously do 
away with the immense economic disparities caused by these laws. 
Land reform at the turn of democracy in 1994 was introduced as a means of restoring social 
injustices to the masses. Although its intentions and aims were to bring about justice, it has 
been plagued with many challenges. These challenges are inherited. Land reform is therefore 
an attempt by the first democratically elected government to redress previous social 
injustices. It seeks to alter the racial pattern of land ownership and access to land in South 
Africa (Jacobs et al, 2003) in Jaricha (2013:82). The programme is based on three separate 
but connected pillars: land restitution, land-tenure reform and land redistribution (Moseley& 
McCusker, 2008: 324).  The first is concerned with reparations for land that was improperly 
seized; it covers forced removals which took place after 1913. Land tenure is about tenure 
issues in communal areas including large parts of the former Bantustans whilst also seeking 
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to protect the rights of tenants found on predominantly white owned farms. Lastly, 
redistribution is the transfer of land from white communities to black ones facilitated through 
a willing buyer-willing seller, market-based approach (Moseley& McCusker, 2008: 324). It 
provides the landless with land that is productive and residential (Kahn, 2007). 
3.1.1 Settlement Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG)  
Land redistribution has been through many stages since its inception. The first policy, 
Settlement  Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG), which was adopted from 1995 to 1999, was to 
enable poor households to purchase land through grants of R16 000. The high price of land, 
as compared to the grants, required groups to pull together their grants so as to afford the 
land. What this led to was overcrowding, which made it difficult for the new owners of this 
land to forge livelihoods from it. As Hall (2004: 215) suggests, the acquisition of land was 
not linked to people generating livelihoods from it. It was the only model that even attempted 
to include the rural poor despite the disjuncture between acquiring the land and social 
implications thereafter. The intentions were good and aimed at the poor but the aftermath of 
different individuals on one piece of land were not thought of. In Hebinck and Cousins (2013: 
49) it is said that the group would buy and jointly hold land under a formal title deed. This 
grouping of different people with different purposes would obviously be problematic, that is 
how conflict arose as there are competing ideas. With overcrowding being the primary issue, 
unemployment could not be tackled because it was difficult to get the beneficiaries to come 
to an agreement on who could be identified as a leader, or even just what crop to farm. These 
ended up taking precedence over employment creation and sustaining their own livelihoods.  
3.1.2 Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) 
The second model, Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD), was a 
response to the wide criticism of the previous policy. Due to the high price of land, in the 
previous policy, groups had to be formed in order to afford the land. This shows that it was 
not in favour of the poor despite the term “Pro-poor”. Again, the following one was also not 
favourable, it “was originally designed for people with capital to invest, preferably those with 
agricultural diplomas” (Hall, 2004: 216). This statement on its own contradicts the aim of 
land reform. As stated by Jacobs et al in Jaricha (2013:82) it sought to alter the racial pattern 
of land ownership and access to land in South Africa. The fact that it was created with a 
specific type of group excludes the very people it is meant to cater for. If people were 
dispossessed and their ties with the land severed, at what point would they have been able to 
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attain those diplomas in a field such as agriculture which until that point in time was a foreign 
concept. The requirements of LRAD are too high a ceiling and cancel out any means of 
restoring social injustices.  The commercial framework within which LRAD was created is an 
immediate fail for the landless in South Africa. If land reform was meant to be pro-poor, with 
an emphasis on development, and if it is meant to transform social and economic relations as 
noted by Hall (2004: 214), it is failed to launch.  The only people benefitting from LRAD are 
those with capital, meaning that they are not landless or in need of their economic status 
being changed. It promised economic growth only for those who already have their bread 
buttered on both sides.  
3.1.3 Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy (PLAS) 
The Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy (PLAS) was introduced in 2006. Its main objectives 
were to accelerate the delivery of land and give government more flexibility. It is to “enable 
provincial land reform offices to acquire  land for which beneficiaries could  be identified 
after the fact, most or all of whom would be allocated land on a lease-to-purchase basis” 
(Aliber et al, 2013:27). According to Hebinck and Cousins (2013: 54) the PLAS programme 
has contributed the largest share of land acquired for distribution. Although it might have 
contributed the most, it still did not cater for those land reform  was supposedly designed for- 
the rural poor. It is almost impossible to build economic growth and simultaneously create a 
significant class of commercial black farmers, yet that is what these policies have promised. 
After all the research, it still is not clear what happens to the farmer should they not make 
enough profit to purchase the land. Do they get the lease period extended or perhaps taken off 
the farm. There has not been a clear alternative that I have come across. It is my assumption 
that the farmer is returned to their previous place of residence. Proving yet again that it is a 
policy that is made appealable to already well off individuals because the individual would 
require a backup plan or alternative should the purchase option not work out.  
3.2 Challenges of Land Reform Policies disguised by continuities of the past 
Throughout the two policies, LRAD and PLAS, an overriding theme is the marginalisation of 
the poor. With PLAS, not only are there mentors that are white former commercial famers, 
but they are tasked with graduating black farmers from small-holdings to commercial farmers 
(Hebinck and Cousins, 2013:55). It would appear again that the programme needs to review 
its aims as it now seems to be interested in large-scale capitalist agriculture. This also has the 
implication that mechanisms used by the black smallholder farmers are not modern or 
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developed enough to yield produce, which is – in South Africa’s specific history – a highly 
problematic and a sensitive issue. It insinuates that yet again the African is unable to handle 
such responsibility or that they are in need of supervision.  What it further does is strip the 
new farmers of any form of agency and coerces a relationship of dependency between them 
and the mentors or “strategic partners” (Hebinck and Cousins, 2013: 55). The fact that the 
mentor is involved and highly influences most decisions on the farm means that the land is 
still under the control of a white commercial farmer despite change of ownership in terms of 
leasing. Another aspect of this arrangement that I think was not fully considered is the social 
consequences or conflicts that may arise. It was thought to be ideal and it is highly 
romanticised with issues such as the mentor purposely sabotaging the farmer and 
recommending unfitting livestock, as mentioned by Mr Mbixane2 . This partnership is not 
ideal and according to Attfield et al (2004:417) one of the failures of land reform is that it is 
actually a source of inequality and conflict. Bearing in mind that Attfield et al (2004: 417) 
was writing two years prior to the launch of PLAS, the authors were still accurate in their 
arguments in terms of not being able to bring about justice or reconciliation. Having 
discussed the most recent but still ill-fitting policy, continuities from the Apartheid era which 
are the problems within land reform still emerge.   
3.2.1 Inequality and Conflict 
Still on the topic of land reform being a source of inequality and conflict as argued by 
Attfield et al (2004: 417), this too is a legacy of Apartheid. Due to forced removals of the 
black people, restitution is meant to be the cornerstone of land reform, meaning that the 
programme and policies in place are central to restoration.  Even within its aims, there is the 
“redistribution of land to enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis” 
(Attfield et al, 2004: 410). James (2013:32) states that restitution would restore property to 
those black titleholders who had original ownership of it. What was not included or made 
clear in this article is how problematic the notion of citizenship is whilst playing a role in the 
restitution portfolio. Furthermore, it was not clear who would count as a citizen or on what 
factors it is premised. The boundaries and parameters of citizenship today are still causing 
conflict and inequality within the black population, boundaries drawn up by the previous 
government. This demonstrates just one of the many legacies of the Apartheid regime 
preventing successful implementation of land reform which in the end is not functional for 
the people it is meant to be catering.  
                                                          
2 Mr Mbixane. Committee’s Drift. December 2014 
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3.2.2 Citizenship and belonging  
When attempting to restore land or property rights according to citizenship or belonging, it 
becomes problematic as it creates division among black people by marginalising others on 
the basis of what constitutes a citizen.  The lines drawn up, limiting the definition of 
citizenship, are exclusive. In James (2013: 3) it is shown that citizenship is only experienced 
through interaction with others which would cement that identification. The fluidity of 
citizenship is overlooked when narrow and rigid bounds are used, thereafter these 
determining who has property or land rights. How people are affected is when there are 
modifications made along ethnic differentiations which are mechanisms used by the previous 
government, resulting in conflict amongst people claiming the land (conflict on the basis of 
marginalisation and exclusion of certain groups). So in the end, instead of bringing about 
restoration, there are rifts deepened which date back to the Apartheid-era. Such constructs 
bring about further challenges to the implementation of these policies. 
 3.2.3 Problematic Constitution  
Another problematic aspect of land reform that serves as a big hindrance of fulfilling its aims 
is the constitution of 1996. In Hebinck and Cousins (2013: 48) it is noted that under 
discussion was the wording of a property clause that would protect existing property rights 
but at the same time allow for land reform. An attempt at this alone is nonsensical, it is 
impossible to do both, especially simultaneously. It is in fact paradoxical. One cannot say that 
they are going to give back land that was dispossessed from the original owners but at the 
same time promise to not take the very same land way from the people now living on that 
land. The final constitution which was adopted in 1996 states that “no one may be deprived 
of property except in terms of law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary 
deprivation of property” (Ntsebeza, 2007: 117) with the next subsection noting that property 
may not be expropriated unless there is some form of compensation that is agreed upon by all 
parties involved with the inclusion of many factors. The first statement is crystal clear in that 
the white property owners will have their land indefinitely because no one will deprive them 
of land that initially does not belong to them. And, should there be any attempt at that, there 
is no law that permits deprivation of that property arbitrarily. The wording alone of arbitrary 
I find very thorny since the seriousness and sensitivity of the history of dispossession could 
never be haphazard or based on random chance. Any action taken towards this restructuring 
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should never be described as such, therefore any expropriation of property is just. Moving 
onto the second subsection, where the current property owners may not have their property 
expropriated unless there is compensation that is just and equitable, dependent on current use 
of that property and market value etc. What seems to be forgotten is that no such factors were 
taken into consideration when land was being snatched from the black population. No one 
asked questions about market value or current use of the land when people were forcibly 
removed. So when these factors are meant to be contemplated when property should be 
seized, it is difficult to grapple with. What also seems to act as a continuation of Apartheid is 
the guarantee of white privilege over rights belonging to the landless black population. This 
guarantee which is in the form of the clause is but written by individuals. The fact that the 
clause is still in existence is proof that it is beneficial for some individuals. Years after 
Apartheid was formally dismantled, interests of the white population are still a priority.      
Additionally, it has not only failed the people but it is a replica of history where the majority 
of the population was moved to the smallest percentage with unfavourable conditions, and 
were facing measures that ensured the persistence of poverty. Working within bounds that are 
still more favourable for the minority owning land means that the approach adopted by 
programme “does not seek to break the power of the rural elites, instead it seeks to bribe them 
into participating in the land reform projects” (Mngxitama, 2001: 8). Yet again, reiterating 
the fact that it is not making use of the capability of eroding the “power of the dominant class 
in the rural society” Sobha in Mngxitama (2001: 7). 
 Glancing back at PLAS, this proves to be true because there are a number of white former 
commercial farmers being paid to assist emerging black farmers.  It is complimentary for the 
white farmer as he is getting money, while rescuing the unknowledgeable black farmer who 
is working tirelessly to prove himself worthy of attaining land that once belonged to his 
forefathers. This arrangement places the black farmer at the mercy of the sometimes non-
cooperative ‘mentor or strategic partner’ (Hebink and Cousins, 2013: 55) laying a foundation 
for unequal power relations already spoken of previously. So with such protective measures 
in place, land reform is continually failing to redress historical questions. It therefore unable 
to deal with poverty.  
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3.2.4 The Failures of ESTA 
 Tenure forms is one of the three pillars of the land reform programme. Under this tenure 
umbrella, there have been two laws established; Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 
1997 (ESTA) and the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 2 of 1996 (LTA) Hall in Ntsebeza 
et al (2007: 95). These laws are there to protect farm workers and their dependents but fail to 
do so as they do not at all prevent evictions but provide guidelines to follow when doing so. 
More than a century ago, black farm labourers did not have secure tenure. Today, after the 
establishment of tenure reform which is meant to “legally secure the rights of people 
occupying and using land, balancing these equitably against the rights of owners” Hall in 
Ntsebeza (2007:95), they still lack that security. However according to Orton et al (2001: 
473) ESTA has increased the tenure security rights of farm workers. She failed to further 
elaborate how this was done. An act that formalizes a process such as eviction is not 
protective in anyway, especially since it fails to account for female workers, who according 
to most farmers are not full-time employees requiring full-time packages or benefits. To 
support this, Naidoo (2011:94) adds that “Violations of rights of women, casuals and 
seasonal workers go undetected”. Furthermore, most women farm dwellers are not 
considered occupiers in their own right, but secondary occupiers whose tenure is contingent 
on the continued employment on the farm of their male partners (Hall et al, 2003: 
12).Whether eviction has occurred within the legal route or not, it still dissolves the farm 
workers’ social realm which is central to all aspects their life. The act stipulates that 
alternative accommodation should be provided, yet the concept of accommodation is far too 
narrow. Alternative accommodation is defined as “safe and overall not less favourable than 
the occupiers’ previous situation with regard to the residential accommodation and land for 
agricultural use to them prior to eviction” (Roodt, 2007: 5). Accommodation in this act has 
been outlined merely as space with no relations to and within it. With relocation there would 
be disruption of other interconnecting aspects of their lives which all stem from the space 
within which they live. Already the implementation of ESTA is an issue since the onus is on 
the farmer to ensure that the guidelines are being followed. The rare implementation of the 
act fails to secure the maintenance of their livelihood as they knew it. Roodt (2007:12) 
concluded that when moved to urban townships, livelihood benefits are lost.  
 Furthermore, there is always a difference between design and reality. The tenure programme 
was designed to ‘protect’ tenure rights of those on the farm, yet the “unintended consequence 
of ESTA has been the eviction of potential beneﬁciaries” (Letsoalo and Thupana, 2013: 303). 
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Comparable to the land reform programme overall, it is most detrimental for those it was 
meant to restore justice. So in spite of the existence of ESTA, black farm labourers and 
dwellers on white commercial farms find themselves in the very same circumstance despite it 
being twenty years after Apartheid. These are some of the obstacles to the land reform 
programme.  The inability of the new government to secure land tenure for farm labourers is 
a continuity of the past. 
Letsoalo and Thupana (2013: 298) noted how the biggest challenges to these policies has 
nothing to do with pace but more so in content.  Whilst formulating ESTA, the policy 
developers seemed to overlook consequences of the laws. There was no consideration for 
power relations between the farm worker and owner prior to the eviction and what would 
take place thereafter. Considering the existing power relations, it would be almost impossible 
for a farmer along with their dependents to demand evictions within the legal framework. Du 
Toit (2013: 19) states that these approaches are riddled with unrealistic expectations 
especially in a capacity-strapped state. It is unrealistic that an illiterate farm worker who has 
not been exposed to ESTA must now demand the acknowledgement of their constitutional 
right. Furthermore, the programme is unable to monitor all farms ensuring that the workers 
and dependents are evicted within the ESTA framework.  
It seems that the current government is continually failing to break free from structures put in 
place by the previous regime. Failure to do so results in the implementation of ineffective 
land reform policies or purely the lack of action in their implementation due to a shortage of 
capacity. With evidence from above, it can be said that all provisions put in place at the turn 
of democracy ensured no change in socio-economic standing of most whites in agriculture 
such as the strategic mentor arrangement, inadequate ESTA and property clause in the 
constitution. As long as there are unseen holds which mould these transformative policies, 
there is no such thing as redressing historical question of dispossession which has resulted in 
a “situation of poverty being a black and primarily a rural problem” (Mngxitama, 2001:3). 
The structural hold of the past systems dating back from the colonial era such as the lack of 
secure tenure experienced by African farm labourers in 1920 to the consolidation of land 
ownership by white commercial farmers today is the reason Mamdani (1996: 8) maintains 
firmly that South Africa is still in a colonial period as there are structures still in place, 
carried over from previous eras into the current one. Even when it may seem as though some 
progressive moves are made by the post-Apartheid government, these moves are made within 
the colonial strongholds.  
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3.2.5 Restitution Financial Awards  
Praising the efforts of the land reform programme in addressing the historical question 
becomes difficult and complex. Within the restitution leg of the programme, a decision was 
made to have financial rewards as one of its means of reparations (Atuahene, 2011:968). 
These reparations would only be considered for those who were dispossessed after June 1913, 
this itself is highly limiting as laws passed in 1894 called the Glen Grey Act (Bundy, 
1979:135) already ensured the severing of ties between land and the black nation.  
Additionally, according to Mngxitama (2001:5), “the Glen Grey Act was to set the stage for 
later land and labour practices by settler governments”. Due to decades of poverty and 
landlessness, there is no possibility of catching up and being on the same footing as whites. 
An NGO director expressed that “financial compensation will not transform levels of poverty 
and land ownership” (Atuahene, 2011:972). No amount of money can equate to what would 
have been their lives had there not been that annihilation of life as they knew it. I find that the 
monetary value as a means of redress is insulting because even Minkley & Westaway (2008: 
105) note that the restitution process is meant to provide a measure of justice. There can 
never be a price attached to justice, period. Additionally, Atuahene’s (2011: 956) choice of 
words seem insufficient in actually capturing the repercussions of all those years of 
dispossession. She describes the erosion of land rights requiring a remedy. This connotes an 
illness or bug that requires a concoction or potion to settle, which is how the programme 
policies have been treated; as some tonic with overnight results. 
Land reform is about generating and sustaining a livelihood yet those seeking reparations are 
directed to processes that are not at all sustainable, such as financial compensation, so as to 
avoid “valuations which are therefore cheaper and faster to deliver” (Rugege, 2004:7). 
Purchasing a taxi does not improve standards of living. How would one maintain this if the 
family is poor beforehand? The vehicle would not make everyday costs more tolerable as 
servicing the taxi is costly and those funds would actually be a setback. For those reasons, I 
am in agreement with Atuahene who, in her study on urban claimants in Gauteng and 
Western Cape, concludes that “financial awards did not have a sustainable economic benefit 
for claimants” (Atuahene, 2011: 972). The slight differences the compensations made cannot 
be disqualified, but they remain minor.   
According to a Regional Land Claims Commission (RLCC) official in Atuahene (2011:970), 
the claimants lack the rationality and civilization to put the small reward to good use. Such 
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bigotry by departmental officials is highly problematic, especially when they are the ones 
who are meant to help the claimants. What has changed with this thinking is that it no longer 
stems from white people but now from black people who clearly do not consider themselves 
part of the group that is unable to rationalise due to the fact that they are not poor or in need 
of land. This brings up the issue of black versus white, along with the many stereotypes 
attached to the black man’s thinking. The whole arrangement of encouraging claimants to 
settle for financial rewards is like looking into the past, when black people were driven off 
their land. It comes across as though the government is paying the claimants to keep quiet, 
literally shoving money into their mouths whilst the current white owners of that land live 
comfortably undisturbed. Which is why Lestoalo and Thupana (2013: 300) would argue that 
manoeuvres of the Apartheid government are present in every aspect of South Africa’s land 
reform programmes.  
In Hall et al (2003:5) it is noted that the restitution programme has had a major achievement 
due to its large number of claims settled.  Despite the high number of claims settled, the 
claims do not translate into an increase in black ownership of land. This is why Hall’s claim 
itself is refutable. The processes of restitution have been easily dichotomized, in the sense 
that what was lost can simply be replaced with another. Once the loss has been restored, then 
restitution is considered successful which is why Hall et al (2003:5) would describe a 
quantified estimate of claims settled as commendable. Walker in Hall (2014:8) is cited as 
observing that there is a master narrative of loss and restoration in public discussion, which is 
correct. There is a simplistic view that once the claimants have land everything such as land 
ownership will be balanced. It is not taking into consideration the social phase thereafter. Just 
as in the case of ESTA where the evictor is required to provide alternative accommodation, 
relocating the evictee does not restore what was lost which is more than just accommodation. 
In both cases, land or space is reduced to material conditions. Apart from restoring land, one 
of the forms of restitution reparations are financial awards which seem to be more popular 
amongst the urban claimants. It results in the core land issue not being addressed which is the 
skewed nature of land ownership (Sibanda, 2007:2)  as there are no transfers of land taking 
place. In Rugege (2004:7) it is reported that the CRLR argued that many in urban areas 
insisted on monetary compensation rather than land due to poverty. But then, what of those in 
rural areas. What justification will be provided for them? Even when land is restored, it is not 
a means to an end as it isolates the social sphere as earlier discussed. The focus on the 
material question of restoring land or granting cash (Hall, 2014:10) makes it evident that land 
40 
 
reform works, in terms, for the current land owner. The state has at times needed to negotiate 
or even offer alternative reparation due to the increased price of land demanded by the 
landowner (Hall, 2003:10). To meet departmental deadlines, the quicker option being 
financial rewards, is chosen over the other three options. Having said that, restitution has not 
made so much progress for it to be a major achievement as more than 60% of urban claimants 
opted for financial compensation whilst a disappointing 46% settled with land (Rugege, 
2004:6) meaning that both rural and urban remain more or less unchanged in terms of transfer 
of land. To deal with the isolation of land, external to social relations thereafter, it is 
suggested that other options be provided such as agricultural college bursaries (CDE, 2008:5) 
by having a combined private and public task team deal with the claims. The alternative 
option provided deals more with what would be termed post-settlement support.   
3.2.6 Post-settlement Support 
Post-settlement support is an integral part in ensuring successful implementation of Land 
reform. Land reform was introduced to alleviate poverty and address the land question in 
terms of land ownership. Successful implementation of the reform programme would result 
in the beneficiary or claimant now able to generate and sustain livelihoods while land is 
largely under ownership of blacks. Aftercare (as it is also known) does assist, but it does not 
guarantee that the beneficiary is able to get the most out of the newly acquired land, such as  
making a life from land and dealing with poverty. The fact that poverty eradication was 
included in the programmes and aims means that the new farmers are not required to farm 
commercially on a large scale, but are expected to be subsistent farmers. However, there is a 
disconnection within this programme which further depicts its problematic and unrealistic 
policy content.  
The split has to do with the shift that took place, which is not in sync with land reform 
objectives. There has been a move within the programme from poor and landless to one 
aimed at creating a new class of commercial farmers. It has been made clear by the type of 
post-settlement support given to farmers, which promotes farming on a larger scale than they 
are used to.  
Contrastingly, organisations such as Masifunde advocate for sustainable farming. There 
exists a binary between the types of production promoted by departments such as the 
Department of Agriculture/Department of Rural Development/ Land Reform and those of the 
organisations. The farmers are provided with chemicals such as pesticides and inputs that 
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drive massive production while on the other side of the spectrum, organisations supply 
workshops on agro-ecology. Kahn (2007:23) small-scale farming is the way forward but, 
unfortunately, this ideal has not been realised as yet.  
Post-settlement defined according to Hall (2004: 220) is infrastructure, extension officers, 
access to input including credit and access to markets. Those are the more tangible ones and 
geared towards the commercial model of farming whereas there exists other forms, such as 
expertise knowledge (project management) and social ones such as conflict solution 
(Anseeuw & Mathebula, 2008:13). Both these types of support would be necessary on a 
former commercial farm, especially if it was subdivided and accommodating a number of 
families in which project management and dispute resolution would be used. With 
application of this support wholly, land reform in terms of land transfer will succeed, and 
issues of poverty and employment creation which then would be addressed by sustainable 
living. Hebincks & Cousins (2013:19) the irrelevance of post-settlement support, in some 
cases, which therefore fails to deliver relevant knowledge and information. There is 
incongruity between the realities of beneficiaries and the supposed idea of what successful 
agriculture is. What should be pointed out is that not all commercial business models define 
real agriculture and should not rule out small scale farming. There is unrealistic expectation 
for new landowners to perform on the same level as previous owners which results in the 
projects being up scaled to maintain the same production as predecessors, Hebinck & Cousins 
(2013:77). This demonstrates the move from catering for the poor to placing state’s interests 
above those of beneficiaries, for whom land reform is. The maintenance and priority  of 
capitalistic production is not at all in line with sustainable livelihoods which is the approach 
land reform is premised on.  
It has been problematized that the large scale commercial farming model is promoted when 
it’s known to be ill fitting especially when addressing poverty and unemployment. The 
formerly landless whom were unable to sustain themselves, are now expected to generate 
produce on large scale. Even when beneficiaries attempt to farm intensively as told by 
consultants, the benefits are minimal in terms of poverty alleviation.  
Overall it can be said that land reform has been experiencing more problems than successes. 
What makes these problems even more difficult to tackle is that they are legacies inherited by 
the present government and provide frameworks in which these policies are meant to 
function.  Unless the content of this programme is totally overhauled, perhaps it could at least 
42 
 
serve one of its aims such as attempting to alleviate poverty, which is linked to access to land. 
This could result in sustaining livelihoods but, only with sufficient post-settlement support. 
Transfer of land alone into black ownership will not eradicate poverty and inequality. The 
intricacies involved are highly underplayed, with that the policies thought to be 
unproblematically implemented. Until that happens, the interests of the white elite will 
always be protected as the forerunners of today’s government ensured so, while the majority 
of South Africa slumbers in a colonial style bed remaining untransformed despite change in 
government, failing the many landless black South Africans. 
This chapter has been a discussion of the unrealistic ESTA expectations by its creators and 
therefore failing to protect those for whom it was created. The constitutional property clause 
which continues to prove problematic was presented. Additionally, how the restitution 
portfolio brings back notions of citizenship and how at times is the basis of decision-making. 
Furthermore, the departments involved in post-settlement support and their contradictory 
views to those of the organisations they work with were displayed.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
History of the National Land Committee and Border Rural Committee 
This chapter provides an outline of the organisations that played a central role in the land 
sector in South Africa from the forced removals in the 1980s to the Bredell removals recently 
in Johannesburg. An outline of these organisations underpins any challenges Masifunde as an 
organisation in land may face in terms of identity which forms the basis of the relationships 
with other role players, from the state to constituents. It also allows for an assessment of their 
impact in the land reform landscape which is pivotal in exploring the role of NGOs in land 
reform.   
 A skeletal background of each organisation is provided. Further, the struggles they find 
themselves in due to their interwoven relationship with different various actors demonstrates 
their complexities. These intricacies in identity and diversity at times prove to be their 
demise.  
 Moyo is cited in Mngxitama (2005: 34) NGOs in Southern Africa have limited involvement 
in, and impact on, land reforms in terms of promoting greater land redistribution to the poor 
and disadvantaged groups, or in protecting and defending their land rights. This can be truly 
said about the actions of the National Land Committee (NLC) during the transition period to 
democracy. What could be questionable is whether this view is applicable to recently formed 
NGOs or if it refers only to those who have stepped in from the previous regime into the 
current democratic one.  
4.1 National Land Committee 
The NLC, formed with opposing strands within it, was the only “segment of civil society 
with a national presence struggling for land ownership patterns to change” Mnxgitama 
(2006:45). Today the NLC is just a memory. Due to its multi layered identity formed by its 
diverse members, it felt the need to fulfil various objectives, at times conflicting.  
As some point, the NLC was seen as powerful by being the only organisation struggling for 
the change in land ownership patterns as noted above. It had a network with almost a 
representative in each province (Mnxgitama, 2006:45). It should also be commended for 
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publicising the atrocities and suffering of landless people as a result of forced removals. In 
spite of this, it was terminated in 2006, (Amanor& Moyo, 2008:47) due to its multi layered 
identity.  
Initially known as National Committee Against Removals (NCAR), NLC was formed during 
the height of forced removals and evictions in the 80s as did many other organisations 
emerging at this time. At this point the land question was of highest priority as forced 
removals continued to be the establishment and maintenance of Apartheid in South Africa 
(Platzky & Walker, 1985:7). It is recorded that from 1960 to mid-1983 an outstanding 3.5 
million people were relocated, taking note that this excludes those affected by influx control 
in urban areas. Influx control is the network of legislation and regulations which controls 
African access to the urban-industrial centres situated in what was claimed to be white South 
Africa (Platzky & Walker, 1985: 32). Apart from tearing African social ties; what effect these 
Apartheid mechanisms had was the creation of farm dweller identity. This implication of 
Apartheid is not isolated, but is the most pivotal one as it secured the African as an 
appendage for the production and maintenance of white capitalism in the country. This 
definition or new identity in which they were coerced, allowed for the “blacks to be defined 
outside of civil society” Mngxitama (2005: 8) according to Mamdani’s (1996) definition. Due 
to this forged identity South Africans formed then, many today find themselves landless and 
living in poverty.   
The involvement of the NLC spans from the forced removals in the 80s to the fighting for 
pro-poor land reform programmes in South Africa during the early 2000s. Their involvement 
included campaigning, informing the world of the landless’ sufferings which resulted in the 
detaining of many, including harassment of fieldworkers (Platzky & Walker, 1985: 15). 
Despite such treatment from the Apartheid government, the staff were able to act as a 
watchdog on “human rights abuses related to forced removals” (Mngxitama, 2005: 12). I find 
the origins of NLC rather contradictory because it was driven by white liberals with their 
welfarist concerns yet with no clear emancipatory project. Which is perhaps why Mngxitama 
(2005) found the committee to be filled with patronising elements which he extended to say 
are representative of racist lexicons. In his view; the fact that it was driven by whites is 
problematic. This would have to be my interpretation as he goes on to say that “the 
possessive, my people” is part of a racist lexicon used by settler farmers. Yes, it is true the 
latter made use of those terms but to say that it is part of a possessive discourse is taking it 
too far. The white counterparts who form part of the organisation are showing some form of 
45 
 
belonging. Apart from the symbolic protests (which will be discussed shortly) this is not at all 
paternalistic. He may as well argue that white people in the United Democratic Front (UDF) 
are not allowed to put up the clenched fist sign of Amandla.   
The only justification Mngxitama (2005) has in saying that there are paternalistic and perhaps 
patronising elements is with regard to land occupations. Land occupations demonstrated the 
strain between the two different strands spoken of in previous paragraphs. The NLC was not 
knowing whether to sit waiting for the democratic state to embrace it with open arms or not 
wait for any inclusion in the coming democracy and take back what is theirs (land); 
regardless. The presumption here is that the latter was the dominant strand as evidence shows 
that later, almost all activists were swallowed up by government departments. The 
paternalistic theme here would be that the white liberals, viewing the constituents as 
belonging to them, or under their guidance should not seek to do something so preposterous 
or out of bounds (drawn up by them) such as occupying land that once belonged to them.  
Furthermore, what may also come across as patronising is its rejection of breaking structures 
and opting to work within the existing ones. Mngxitama (2005: 11) notes how the main issue 
was that it could not conceive the destruction of South African civilisation, it hoped for 
integration of the excluded without fundamentally changing the order of things. NLC only 
saw it fit to partake in symbolic protests, i.e. land occupations just as a means to get a point 
across. Engagement in metaphorical protests lightens the demands the landless seek. There is 
nothing symbolic about taking action, meaning the performance of occupying was to advance 
agendas; not meaning to disrupt existing structures if everything is meant to be representative 
of something else. The choice to rather straddle both positions with landless people and 
waiting on for democratic ideals from the new government makes it evident that it was torn 
between what can be described as ‘radical’ action and possible change in the system in terms 
of policy. NLC is noted to be part of those that argued against the protection of the property 
bill in the Bill of Rights which would actually ensure that historic land theft would be 
legitimised by the new constitution (Mngxitama; 2005: 20) yet it still seemed not to know 
which relationship to nurture most; landless or new government.  
The slow build up to the demise of the NLC may be attributed to its ‘on the fence’ position, 
between the people it claimed to support and represent and those it sought to impress. This 
indecisiveness is alarming as this is the very same organisation that promoted and was in the 
stern belief that pressure from below is the most effective mechanism to galvanise more 
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effective state action on land (Amanor & Moyo, 2008: 47). They propagate one thing and do 
another. If mobilisation from below is what is best, then it should make logical sense that 
white liberalists cannot fully understand the plight of the landless, they can only empathise. 
This is linked to Mnxgitama’s argument that within the organisation were racist lexicons. I 
am not entirely in agreement with this as there is only a correlation between the liberalists’ 
race and the position and words such as ‘my people’ there is no causal relationship. 
Mngxitama might be adamant about this argument because, placed within South African 
historical context, it might appear to be problematic.   
The inability of organisations to serve its people would bring them to say that NGO’s must 
just give them information and funds but should not speak for them as they will do that 
themselves (Mngxitama, 2005: 26). As seen with the NLC, the only doubt that supports the 
inability to serve its people is its relationships with government. Having any form of ties with 
government raises complexities. The case of NLC problematizes any relationship or 
partnership, depending on what the argument is, with government. In a description of civil 
society, organisations with a focus on land NGO sector, Amanor & Moyo (2008: 50) point 
out that NGOs face serious identity and strategy dilemmas as they are meant to support 
positive aspects of government’s land programme but on the other hand, they remain 
sensitive and responsive to a constituency of rural poor. This is highly difficult to maintain 
simultaneously. They are expected to fulfil two competing objectives. It was common, just 
after the turn of democracy, for organisations and government to be in ‘partnerships’, which I 
am not in agreement with. A partnership is based on equal footing, with the attempt of 
balance between two actors involved. So it cannot be called a partnership with the state if 
work is being divested onto the NGO and at the same time have to promise to work in the 
interests of people who are holding the state accountable to deliver on its promises. That is 
why the NLC, after a seemingly happy relationship, opted for a “critical relationship” 
(Mngxitama, 2005: 27) with the state as the partnership had resulted in “patching holes left 
by government neglect” (Mngxitama, 2005: 34).        
4.2 Landless Peoples’ Movement (LPM) 
The formation of Landless Peoples’ Movement (LPM) cannot be discussed separately from 
the National Land Committee due to it birthing the movement. The organisation incorporated 
and dealt with farm workers, labour tenants, and the unemployed in urban and peri-urban 
areas (Kahn, 2007:8). With the NLC slowly fading, LPM emerged to be the most visible rural 
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social movement (Amaron & Moyo, 2008: 50) as did the NLC earlier. Although having been 
a product of the NLC, compared to the committee, LPM was more radical. Some might argue 
that it is due to its being a movement rather than an organisation. I am not disputing that 
possibility, but it is credited to the fact that the NLC was now splitting with no specific 
direction. NLC’s presence in defending residents facing immediate threat of forced removal 
in 2001 and 2002 portrays the somewhat radical nature of the movement (Greenberg, 2004: 
18), this radicalism is also what sparked the division between LPM and other NGOs. Their 
differing views on how to act towards the government, where NLC affiliates who were 
against the struggles of the LPM, which were seen to be increasingly confrontational 
(Helliker, 2013:320). According to the LPM, “redistribution from below through mass 
occupations would be necessary to ensure the transfer of land” (Greenberg, 2004: 19), 
something the NLC advocated or pretended to advocate.   
The short life span of the LPM was a result of its radical nature. Its radicalness is central to its 
demise. Its radicalness intersecting with other factors such as the shift and change of time into 
democracy proved to be problematic. Additionally, the concern of autonomy from the NLC 
arose as it struggled to keep the LPM subdued which boils down to the issue of identity. 
Greenberg (2004:21) notes how the NLC reasserted its control over the movement in an 
attempt to protect the integrity of the state.  Basically the LPM failed to maintain its 
relevance in the political landscape with the transition or rather it was unable to find a niche 
in which to slot itself. It was conflicted as to what direction to take. Sarte is cited in 
Greenberg (2004:22) that once an immediate purpose has been achieved a group of 
individuals usually disintegrates making it evident that the transition challenged the position 
of the movement. Overall, with the change into democracy, the radicals within the LPM 
failed to survive whilst the balance were absorbed into government networks.  
 
 
4.3. Border Rural Committee (BRC)  
Border Rural Committee (BRC) originally known as Grahamstown Anti-Removals 
Committee (GRC), organised by students, also emerged as an affiliate of the then NCAR. 
With the change in name, was the change and redirection in vision and role to play in the 
Eastern Cape. This organisation mobilizes rural communities by assisting them to lobby for 
access to land and resources (BRC, 1999:7). Strategies used by BRC to carry out their work 
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is through “research, advocacy, information dissemination, development facilitation, 
institution building and networking & brokering” (BRC, 1999:8). In 2002, BRC formed a 
social movement called Vulamasango Singene (let us in). This was an agricultural betterment 
restitution campaign in response to the government’s exclusion of the betterment restitution 
from the land restitution programme. Betterment planning was introduced in an attempt to 
control land usage in African reserves (Platzky & Walker, 1985:45). The government at that 
time was squeezing the most they could out of the land to accommodate more people. BRC, 
then, was aiming to ensure that government addresses the legacy of betterment. Following 
negotiations with BRC, a task team was set up that recommended the cabinet permit for a six-
month window to lodge claims for betterment restitution (Vulamasango Singene, 2004:3).     
 
During the 1980s, the biggest demon to face was Apartheid, but with the demise of the 
regime, its legacies are the ones being challenged by the community based organisations 
(CBOs) as NGOs are working with government. As Amanor & Moyo (2008:50) observe that 
with the end of Apartheid, civil society [as defined by Steytler et al (1998:121)] pressures 
have lost the zeal that drove them in the 1980. Additionally, NGOs are seen to be anti- land 
reform, which is preposterous. The only reason that could possibly explain this thought is 
their reluctance to attempt transforming systems through persistent applied pressure and 
prefer to tip toe within those same structures until their efforts are acknowledged. 
Furthermore, their persistence on maintaining a ‘neutral’ position is made difficult by the fact 
that most of their former activists now fill up the government offices. Contrastingly, the 
Department of Land Affairs (DLA) blamed many of the initial failures on the involvements 
of NGOs (Nauta, 2004: 223) without providing any reasoning.  A possible reason would be 
that the NGO influenced the department to agree and approve almost impossible promises in 
land reform, whilst pleasing its constituents and placing the department under great pressure.  
With such intricacies, the future of NGOs in the land sector and the role they will play is 
highly questionable. The fact that the constituents these organisations claim to  represent are 
insatiable and seek more effective form of action and organisation with the governmental 
departments which are not welcome to interventions from the organisations, NGOs are 
slowly going to find themselves with no niche to slot themselves. This is not forgetting the 
repression faced by the organisations from the state and the watering down of their structures 
through market-based neoliberal policies. As civil society organisations continuously sell 
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their souls to “corporate capital and the state” (Amaron & Moyo, 2008: 188), the voice of the 
landless poor will slowly dwindle through further marginalisation.    
In this short section, two main organisations’ were discussed. The section showed the 
complex issue of identity and competing internal and external interests in these organisations. 
Murky and complex identity made so by their racial makeup which consequently influenced 
the type of work they did such as protests they partook in. As a result, their positioning was 
questionable, whether they remained neutral or attempted to break the existing structures. The 
downfall being attributed to its identity and strategy dilemmas.   
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CHAPTER 5 
Research design and Methodology 
In this section, the philosophical foundation of the study is briefly outlined, followed by the 
justification for the usage of qualitative research methods and the type of interviews used for 
data collection. Challenges experienced during data collection are made known and any 
weaknesses and strengths this study may have were highlighted.  
This study is rooted in the interpretivist paradigm which suggests that reality can be 
constructed and interpreted differently due to it being relative to time, place and interpreter 
(Whisker, 2001:124). It is based on Dilthey’s (1911/1977) thesis that human discourse cannot 
be analysed with methods of natural and physical sciences (Miles & Huberman, 1994:8) 
which is true in this case as roles and interactions of the social actors involved in land reform 
are unmeasurable in physics and cannot be quantified. It is for these cases where there will be 
interpretation of meanings made by both the social actors and by the researcher. Methods of 
dialectical hermeneutics will be of use to emphasize both the subjective meanings for 
individual actors and the social structures which condition and enable such meanings (Darke 
et al, 1998:277).    
 The adoption of qualitative research is an attempt to capture data on the perceptions of local 
actors from the inside, also known as verstehen, a process of empathetic understanding 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994: 6). As suggested in the thesis title; exploring the role of 
Masifunde in land reform and post-settlement support; qualitative research is used for 
exploratory studies leading into more structured study that would examine causal processes at 
the level of the intentional, self-directing and knowledgeable actors (Hakim, 1987: 26). 
Additionally, the concerns of qualitative researchers is the process rather than outcomes and 
products, which is why it was the chosen research design (Creswell, 1994: 145).  
Procedures used were semi-structured, in-depth interviews which are defined as (Whisker 
2001: 168) as a series of set questions to be asked with space for some divergence, with the 
interviewer then returning to the structured interview questions; supplemented by non-
participative observation. Hakim (1987:26) supports this, “the most common method used is 
the in-depth interview”. Since the researcher in qualitative research is the main measurement 
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device in the study as a result of very little standardised instrumentation (Miles& Huberman, 
1994: 7) all interviews were audio taped.  
Analysing and interpreting data from qualitative research involves “identifying the principal 
emergent ideas in each piece of transcripted data” (Davies, 2007: 193). By repeatedly reading 
data themes, patterns emerged which may be recorded through the use of coding. Creswell 
(1994:154) describes these categories and codes as forming the basis for the emerging story 
to be told by the qualitative researcher. There exist various processes, but this aforementioned 
is one I made use of. One of the limitations of qualitative data is noted by Miles & 
Huberman, 1994:8) as involving problematic processing of field notes as the researcher 
generates data only as one treated as writable/readable or audible in my case. I can relate to 
that as I was reliant on the tape recorder and did not supplement it with writing field notes 
subsequently only audible data was analysed. Strengths of qualitative data is its richness and 
potential for revealing complexity nested in real context (Miles & Huberman, 1994:10). 
Regarding the thesis title, exploring the role of Masifunde involves analysing multi-layered 
intersecting interactions with between various actors which in itself is intricate to provide a 
holistic understanding of this role.  
Because I was analysing an organisation, a case study was an appropriate qualitative research 
model. Wisker (2001:190) points this out, that as a method, a case study offers opportunities 
to fully explore in-depth situations, individuals, events, groups or organisations. The type of 
case study used is the descriptive, which may be exploratory or illustrative ‘portraits’ of 
social entities or patterns thought to be typical, representative or average (Hakim, 1987: 61) 
which in this case is applicable. Due to the fact that case studies are typically based on two or 
more methods of data collection (Hakim, 1987: 63) methods used were in-depth semi-
structured open-ended interviews, and non-participative observation and documentary 
analysis.      
Limitations and Delimitations  
Restrictive considerations for a research study establishes the boundaries, exceptions, 
reservations and qualifications inherit in every study (Creswell, 1994:110). Delimitations in 
this study is the specific focus on NGO being Masifunde in Grahamstown as oppose to 
attempting to explore the role of all NGOs in the province or country.    
A limitation is the inclusion of Department of agriculture and Department of Rural 
Development and Land Reform (DRDLR) in this exploration of one actor because it is 
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qualitative research which makes use of interpretations and seeking themes. It might have the 
unintended consequence of raising unrelated interpretations.  
The significance of this research study is its usefulness in directing policy-makers in leading 
to an even bigger study. It would assist policy developers with regards to the successes and 
failures of the current policies in land reform and how to involve assistance from NGOs.  
Additionally it would improve the practice of departments and institutions involved in the 
land reform process as it has exposed their operations with other actors such as NGOs and 
beneficiaries.            
 
 
5.1 Population and Sampling  
Population for this study was made up of Masifunde staff, officials from Department of 
Agriculture and Department of Rural Development as well as land claimants and 
beneficiaries. According to Wisker (2001: 138) a sample is a selected and chosen group upon 
which to carry out research and my chosen participants totalled to eight. They consisted of 
two Masifunde staff, one official from each department as well as three claimants and one 
beneficiary. My preferred method of research was one on one interviews and as a non- 
participant observer on one occasion.    
 
 
5.3 Data Collection  
Department of Agriculture- Grahamstown  
In order to find out the role NGOs play in post-settlement, I had to first explore what the 
department of agriculture does to assists beneficiaries after acquiring land. Assistance is in 
the form of irrigation equipment and supplying of seeds, additionally what other institutions 
do they work with in order to deliver these. What formed the crux of these interviews was 
whether they have any partnership or seek any with existing NGOs. This would help identify 
what, according to the department, they are unable to provide, such that they need assistance 
from an NGO. The procedure for the data collection was a one on one interview which was 
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audio taped. I was unable to combine different forms of collection such as direct observation 
due to the participant’s work commitments.    
 
Department of Rural Development and Land Reform- Port Elizabeth  
I managed to contact officials that work mostly in the field, officials that meet with newly 
placed farmers under the PLAS policy. The data recording procedure consisted of 
observations and one on one interviews. These officials are the mediators, mode of 
communication between the department and the farmers. They deal with issues such livestock 
theft and checking if fencing is appropriate for that specific livestock. I managed to tag along 
to these visits but they did not prove so helpful in questioning how much of NGOs 
involvement is required because these farmers were well off enough to make their own 
purchases then require re-imbursements from the department. From these visits what I could 
deduce are the challenges faced by the farmers and the snail pace from the department in 
responding to their requests in that they end up paying for costs themselves. Additionally, 
work done by the officials was demonstrated but notably that not all farmers require the same 
type of post-settlement support which is given by different departments. The work done by 
Department of Agriculture and Rural Development is different with regards to the calibre of 
farmers; agriculture works with mainly groups whilst rural development with single ones.  
The questions asked were intended to explore the relations between civil society and these 
two departments, which is why I took part in field observation with one of the officials. I had 
to see what their perceptions of each other are, especially with the inclusion of NGOs. It was 
also an attempt to capture the process of acquiring land and the problems experienced 
thereafter.  
Masifunde Education and Development Project Trust 
This proved to be the most difficult to do, getting to speak to the director. Almost no one can 
get passed the secretary. All I was given were the same office numbers, that she would later 
answer and inform me the director is busy. This was after numerous failed attempts at 
camping in the reception area. I was only able to interview two employees from the 
organisation. They were very helpful but unfortunately felt unequipped to answer certain 
questions about the organisation, especially when it came to donors and funding. Getting 
access to them was also challenging because none of the employees are at work at the same 
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time as there seems to be very informal workplace structures. Prior to approaching the 
organisation, I had to rely on the brochure which only provides a skeletal outline of the areas 
they assist in. Another challenge I encountered was the fact that I was not at all times taken 
seriously, I was being promised the organisation’s annual report which I am still yet to 
receive. According to the employees, the report would substitute as an interview.  
The interviews were semi-structured. They consisted of open-ended questions that could also 
be easily directed so as to be focused. The basis for my questions were formed by the 
organisation’s pamphlets and documents, which allowed me to ask further on their goals and 
areas in which they assist in. Consulting these would be considered document analysis 
(Davies, 2007: 185). The interviews were conducted in their offices. The only question the 
employees were hesitant about was the funding, thereafter, they all suggested I ask the 
seemingly mythical director.  
 
Claimants and Beneficiaries 
One of the most daunting tasks was getting access to land claimants or beneficiaries. Through 
help of one of the employees, I was able to come into contact with a claimant who was also a 
community leader and later opened up channels for me to interview other claimants. This too 
proved to be difficult, as I initially had to contact them via cell phone which brought about 
language barrier issues or demonstrated as technological challenge for the more aged 
contacts. I was also told numerous times to call at later stages, at times meaning 3 weeks later 
due to weddings and December festivities.  
Carrying out the interviews was  not easy as I would have to repeat my questions at most 
times using both English and pieces of Zulu in order to get as close to the Xhosa language as 
I could. Their responses were limited as they assured me they do not mind speaking English 
yet I could sense discomfort. Ultimately, they too spoke in two languages; briefly in English 
then elaborating in Xhosa. Which resulted in them rushing through the answers so as to get 
through it quicker. These interviews were also one on one.  
The participants were asked questions from how they acquired the land, to the procedure, at 
what stage did Masifunde get involved and what exactly did they provide. Challenges that the 
claimants and beneficiaries might have experienced with the two departments were also of 
interest to me as it would show where the departments were lacking and perhaps where the 
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NGOs could slot themselves in.  This is necessary as a qualitative researcher, the interest and 
focus is in experiences, processes and participants’ perceptions (Creswell, 1994: 162).   
This research adhered to Rhodes University’s policy on ethical guidelines. The ethics codes 
were revealed to the participants prior to the research, ensuring informed consent. Permission 
was received from participants to record the interviews also prior to conducting the research.   
This chapter has outlined the qualitative research methodologies used in this study.  A 
qualitative approach predicated an interpretivist perspective framing this research was 
explained and justified. My interview procedures were discussed, including reasons for 
chosen methods. Delimitations, limitations and significance were noted so as to show the 
narrowed scope, and in what areas this research will contribute. Other methods used were 
spoken of in the qualitative data analysis section together with their strengths and 
weaknesses. The chosen population from which I sampled was outlined, any challenges 
experienced in terms of access and interview sessions were made aware to the reader.    
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CHAPTER 6 
Case study 
Masifunde as an affiliate of the Education and Development Project Trust is a non-
governmental organisation based in Grahamstown, Eastern Cape. It operates in the Ndlambe 
and Ngqushwa Municipal areas as well. Founded in 1983 by community activists, lawyers 
and freedom fighters, its work centred on education, such as providing tutoring, bursaries for 
secondary and tertiary students and adult literacy. Ten years after its birth, Masifunde geared 
towards another direction of project delivery from the welfarist approach. This approach is 
more people-centred and aims at fostering empowerment. Project delivery approach is 
underpinned by the belief that the poor and disadvantaged are their own agents of 
development.  
To date, the organisation has worked with small-scale farmers, women and youth and the 
unemployed in the peri-urban and rural communities of the Eastern Cape. Their focus areas 
are land access, land use and management, local government and service delivery.  
The purpose of this study is to explore the role of Masifunde non-government organisation in 
land reform and post-settlement support in the Albany District of the Eastern Cape. More 
specifically, it looks at the nature of the relationship between civil society organisations such 
as Masifunde and the Department of Agriculture and Department of Rural Development and 
Land Reform. The perceptions of land reform claimants, Masifunde staff and the relevant 
departmental staff towards each other were explored, with regard to the role of NGOs in the 
implementation of land reform. This section also seeks to further understand if the 
engagement between government and civil society groups like Masifunde are a means to 
assist in areas government is unable to reach or address.  
 
6.1 Donor/NGO nexus. Whose interests are at play?  
There seems to exist a tug of war between the interests of NGOS and those of donors. Due to 
that fact that the donor funds the organisations’ activities it is said that the donor then dictates 
which interests the NGO should address. Gordon & Berkovitch (2006: 2) argue that the donor 
does more than determine what type of work is done, but it shapes and moulds their critical 
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perspective, meaning that it makes up its essence. This argument implies that donors are the 
core of these organisations, with the organisation revolving around the donor. In addition to 
that, as mentioned in chapter 2, NGOs function similarly to profit driven organisations, 
meaning that the organisations will work in the interests of the donor regardless of the 
interests of the constituents. My findings were contrary to that. According to both 
respondents working at Masifunde, the various donors do not influence their work. If 
anything, it was implied that the donors are subordinate to the organisation and its objectives. 
Due to the fact that there are various donors, they all interact differently with the 
organisation. In my results, opposing the literature that suggests that an organisation dictates 
its own activities then interested donors may come forward. Furthermore, it was said by 
Reggie Waldick3 that partnerships are developed with these donors so they would understand 
the context of their work.  
So it’s not funders saying what must be done, it is us that say this is what we wanna 
do. They will say okay let’s not do it this way but that way. Then we agree on that. 
There are funders that make suggestions on to improve programs. Sometimes we 
listen and incorporate, sometimes we say it’s not realistic. 
Masifunde’s relationships with donors then refutes De Mars (2005) and Helliker (2013). 
Firstly, De Mars (2005:44) states that the relationship between NGOs and their partners is not 
one of independency but the NGOs are constituted by their partners. Concurring with that; 
Helliker (2013:318) suggests that they could possibly be used as instruments of global 
donors. If then, Masifunde is not running similarly to a profit-driven organisation, can it be 
said that it is so well established that it is not in need of donors that will influence their work 
therefore not finding themselves accountable to any donor?   
The idea of a partnership between the donor and NGO should not be taken without question. 
Partnerships do not mean equality among those involved. Although the staff may maintain 
that through these partnerships an understanding is created where power is balanced. The 
results paint partnerships in a positive light and in this instance Brinkeroff’s definition is 
applicable; “it incorporates mutual respect, equal participation in decision-making, mutual 
accountability and transparency” Brinkeroff (2002:21). In this regard partnerships are used to 
safeguard against any of the actors from assuming absolute power or subordinating the other. 
Therefore; it has proven that Masifunde, contrary to literature used in previous chapters, is in 
fact open to its own decisions in terms of activities with room for autonomy given by donors. 
                                                          
3 Reggie Waldick. Local government and rural governance officer. Masifunde Building. December 2014 
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The organisation is free from influence by donors making their objectives impenetrable.    
Another staff member reiterates that they as an organisation do not bow down to anyone or 
change the nature of their work. They take the money and do what they do. They do not 
compromise their principles or policies because of donors. Lack of agency from donors is not 
an issue and there is no sense of dependency from the NGO.  
6.2 Representational Claim 
Closely related to the contest of interests is the representational claim. It also ties in with 
agency and dependency.  It centres on the notion that the organisation is the vehicle of 
change for those it claims to represent. Van Driel &Van Haren (2003:535) argue that NGOs 
are seen as suitable instruments for representing their interests due to the close relationship 
with the poor. This theme was visible in the results not only from one group but across the 
board from beneficiaries, Masifunde staff and Department of agriculture staff. As a whole, 
participants felt it necessary that someone else or another entity speak on behalf of those 
unable to voice their concerns or that they were the vehicle of change that communities 
needed. It is highly problematic that representation is secured only through being spoken for.  
Moreover, being spoken for is disempowering. Should the organisation cease to exist, the 
people it previously represented are left stranded. It robs them of any form of agency as they 
are dependent on the organisation to voice their concerns or present their interests to relevant 
parties. In the case of Masifunde, apart from requiring resources such as legal aid, 
beneficiaries now await advice from staff members. It makes one believe that without 
employees of such organisations they are unable to make decisions as they are doubtful of 
their own knowledge. Thinking like the beneficiaries; extension officers imply that this 
supposed closeness to the poor with organisations is required so as to better articulate their 
needs on the farm.  Zama Zikhali, an extension officer from the Department of Agriculture 
mentions how the Eastern Cape Agricultural Research Project (ECARP) is better equipped at 
representing people as they speak their language. This closeness between ECARP and 
beneficiaries placed a higher regard for the organisation over government institutions as these 
institutions are further from the people. It is all rooted in the idea that a more intimate 
relationship between NGOs and constituents is the most suitable for representing them. 
Within this representational claim is the idea that change is possible only through NGOs. So, 
apart from the supposed close-knit relationship NGOs might have with the poor, through the 
knowledge possessed by NGOs, those in need are saved. It paints an image of the NGO as the 
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great messiah to rescue the distraught communities. Representation has been described as a 
necessity by the participants and apart from robbing constituents of agency; it actually left 
them as passive subjects rather than active agents as they are always receiving ‘help’ 
(McSweeny, 2014:277). It reduces them to constantly being recipients of change. To counter 
McSweeny’s argument, Nauta (2004:25) claims that an NGO does not act for itself but to 
empower the grassroots, expressing the power of the grassroots against the elites. Thus 
meaning that Nauta (2004) and Van Driel &Van Haren (2005) are blind to the possible 
influences from donors in ensuring that representation of a specific population is organic and 
free from external factors which, according to Masifunde staff, does not apply to their 
organisation. Not only do they have an understanding with donors, but they empower 
grassroots against the elites in terms of equipping them with legal aid so as to be represented 
in court against the farm owners or providing and facilitating workshops that educate them in 
managing their financials or coming up with business plans.   
6.3 Race and Power relations     
One of the many challenges plaguing land reform is its policies moulded by Apartheid. It is 
basically stuck in the past, failing to identify issues that are problematic due to South Africa’s 
past. Currently within land reform, there are strategic partners (Hebinck and Cousins, 
2013:55) known as mentors. New farmers are offered mentorship as a means of financial and 
technical support which is meant to empower farmers as Mfundo Sodela4 from DRDLR 
explains. In my findings a pattern that emerged was the insistence of not wanting a white 
mentor. A farmer; Mr Mbixane who currently has a white mentor felt that his business 
ventures are not successful as the mentor is  sabotaging him – all of this is based on his race.  
He is playing games with me telling me to buy old cattle from his friends knowing 
very well the cattle are old, all in efforts to embarrass me and help his friends 
financially. (Mr Mbixane) 
Mr Mbixane does not dispute that he is need of this support but maintains that there is no 
sane white man who will whole-heartedly assist a black man run his own farm as they are not 
used to it. In this case it is not only a race issue but it is intertwined with power relations. 
Once race and power intersect, it results in conflict and inequality which is a continuation of 
the country’s history. Which is why Attfield et al (2004:277) maintains that one of land 
reform’s many failures is that it is a source of inequality and conflict. Another participant; 
                                                          
4 Mfundo Sodela. Officer in Recapitalisation and Development Unit under DRDLR. Grahamstown. December 
2014 
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Kholeka5 who although is still in need of mentorship refuses any white mentor. Mbixane 
concurs that white mentors are not good. When asked to elaborate stated that they are not 
good to black people.    
The refusal of white mentors is not only raising issues of power and inequality but brings up 
issues of conflict. Amongst group beneficiaries, the biggest problem is the lack of leadership 
as identified by an extension officer; Gcobani Nontwana which is resolved by having a white 
mentor. In essence the solution to conflict on the farm is a white mentor, meaning that his 
presence will not empower the farmers but actually strip them off of any agency they would 
have had. Gcobani Nontwana6 states:  
A challenge is leadership, our (black) people still need to be treated as employers 
other than employers. It you get a white guy to manage them [cause they need to be 
managed, cause it’s the leadership that is the problem] they will wake up at 3 or 4 
o’clock to do that perfectly. But when it’s them leading themselves, they just don’t 
cause there is no leader.  
The implication of these arrangements were not considered; a group of black farmers under 
the guidance and leadership of a white mentor with the aim of making more money is 
something that has happened for decades now. Government institutions seem to be blind to 
the racial implication because according to their perspective it is more beneficial for the 
farmers as it will yield more productivity. It insinuates that whiteness is equated to efficiency 
and blackness with the lack thereof. Leadership, loosely outlined, is the ability to influence 
each other in order to reach organisational or common goals (David, 2014:2). This is with the 
assumption that those led have common goals with the leader. In South Africa’s context this 
cannot be so, which is made evident with Mr Mbixane’s case. The fact that a white mentor 
and black farmer are working together on one project does mean that they will have a shared 
vision.  Due to the narrow view of this policy, it is failing to live up to its design. The 
distinction between intention and reality is being demonstrated. It was designed with the 
intention to fulfil a specific purpose but is failing to do so because in reality it is perpetuating 
the past. The continuation of the past brings Mnxgitama (2001:8) to argue that the approach 
does not seek to break the power of the rural elites, instead it seeks to bribe them into 
participating in the land reform projects. The participants’ preference for having a black 
mentor is also itself constricting. They are reducing the criteria of this mentorship programme 
to race. Similarly to government officials from Department of Agriculture; participants 
                                                          
5 Kholeka Ziqula. Secretary of Tyelera Farmers Committee. Masifunde Building. December 2014 
6 Gcobani Nontwana. Extension Officer. Department of Agriculture. December 2014. 
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equate a black mentor with an ideal relationship. Whether that black mentor is equipped to 
support them in a way to best increase productivity through the support seems to be of 
concern to them.  
 
6.4 Land as livelihood hindered by Land Reform itself 
The land reform programme is rooted in the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach (SLA) and 
additionally, it was introduced as a commitment to overcoming rural poverty according to 
Bernstein (1998:7). SLA is regarded as the operational vehicle of human development 
(Morse & McNamara, 2013:24) which is why it is the framework encompassing land reform 
as it is founded on the efforts of eliminating poverty and the encouragement of economic 
growth which benefits the poor. This approach aims to enlarge people’s choices through 
development that will provide access to resources needed for a decent standard of living 
(Morse & McNamara, 2013: 25). According to Mngxitama (2001:7) land reform is meant to 
use its capabilities to erode the power of the dominant class in rural society, which it is failing 
to do. The foundation of land reform in SLA is based on the assumption that once the 
dominant class’ presence is done away with in rural society, it will immediately translate into 
the poor having access to development that provides them with resources that will improve 
their standard of living. This resource is land accompanied by skills and knowledge on how 
to best use it. In spite of this; land is not bettering the lives of the poor or placing people at 
the centre of development as the priority concern. What surfaced during my findings was that 
land is failing to sustain livelihoods despite participants acknowledging that it is meant to do 
so. Hindrances to fulfilling its mandate were all pointed to be protective measures for the 
white previous farm owner or policies seeing black farmers as unfit to farm successfully 
without the aid of a white mentor. Ways in which land reform is preventing this realisation is 
firstly by the DRDLR taking too long to review invoices and claiming to be unable to 
reimburse Mr Mbixane due to the high price of some of the items which were purchased 
under the supervision of the white mentor hired by the DRDLR. This delay is preventing him 
from making full use of the land. As stipulated by SLA, one of the resources to improve the 
standard of living is acquiring relevant knowledge, but according to DRDLR, he does not 
possess it hence the introduction of a mentor. Yet, the mentor is purposely providing 
irrelevant knowledge. Similarly, due to the property clause acting as a protective measure, it 
protects interests of the previous owners at the expense of the claimants. As a result of the 
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long legal battle with the owners, beneficiaries are unable to make use of the land 
accordingly. This is supplemented by the fact that on one of the farms transferred, there are 
farmworkers left behind who are also awaiting the outcome of the other farms, resulting in 
theft of livestock among the beneficiaries and claimants.           
  
      6.5 Incongruent views of Masifunde and Department of Agriculture  
Despite having worked together on the same projects, the organisation and government 
department do not see eye to eye on one important and central issue: the type of farming that 
should be carried out by farmers. The organisation firmly believes in ancient ways of farming 
as described by Siyabonga Masinda:7   
  We teach them about the ancient ways of farming, how to take care of their plants  
As opposed to Zama Zikhali: 
Promoting massive food production meaning you must apply fertilizer or chemicals so 
that food will be produced in abundance. But then when it comes to them, they wanna 
go organic so when you go the farms, which it cannot be practiced with massive 
production only smaller scale whereas we are encouraging bigger scale. 
 
Zama Zikhali8 points out that the work they do is to encourage farming on a larger scale. 
Hebinck et al (2011:229) mentions that the ongoing debate between the large and small scale 
farming does not affect experts as the preferred model remains to be large scale and at the 
same time the only experience these experts have is with the large scale extensive agriculture. 
This juxtaposition of food security and commercial farming, frames the type of support they 
then give to beneficiaries. Masifunde provides beneficiaries with training in agro-ecology but 
they are supplied with infrastructural developments such as tractors, from the department. 
Reggie from Masifunde explains how there is need for alternative farming methods as the 
conventional one is problematic in terms of soil erosion.  
 These conflicting perspectives on farming surface their yet again divergent practises within 
the land reform processes.  According to Reggie who works in local and rural governance 
issues at Masifunde, if a beneficiary wanted land but not for profit-making reasons, the state’s 
                                                          
7 Siyabonga Masinda. Land Claims Officer at Masifunde. Masifunde Building. December 2014 
8 Zama Zikhali. Agricultural Development Technician/Extension officer at Department of Agriculture. 
Department of Agriculture, Grahamstown.  
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response would be one of outright rejection. Due to the fact that PLAS is profit-driven, 
intensive commercial farming is a requirement. He further points out that the focus on profit 
does not address the land question as the land will remain in possession of the state should 
the beneficiary fail to produce satisfactory results. On the contrary, extension officer Zama is 
of the belief that PLAS is the best policy so far as it forces beneficiaries to see that farming is 
a business. O’Laughlin et al (2013:13) notes that the existing gap between the conceptions of 
land that the ownership of land will lead to a major improvement in the lives of the rural and 
within the same breathe, that the country has enough land and water resources to sustain rural 
livelihoods.  Masifunde staff seem to attach different meaning to the concept of land, 
meanings of belonging and sustaining oneself. They reiterate that land reform or rather the 
outcome of giving land back should be to feed families and communities which is an extreme 
opposite to the extension officer’s business orientated views. A view that may seemingly 
come across as typical of civil society organisations is that of Siyabonga’s, on land reform; 
that land should be taken back by any means necessary without any compensation.  
6.6 Perceptions of actors involved in post-settlement support 
Above it was shown how different the understandings of the organisation and departments 
are. Due to the polar views, this frames their perceptions of each other. When working 
together, their methods will be determined by their worldviews. There is an air of hostility 
towards Masifunde and other organisations in general from the departments. Masifunde, then, 
is of the view that the departments especially DRDLR is ill equipped in carrying out tasks 
that Masifunde are able to undertake timeously.  By the same token, the agricultural 
department too perceives the DRDLR not to be working as efficiently as it should. More so 
when it comes to handling land claims. This is supported by Reggie’s statement in that 
DRDLR is slow in delivery after it took 4 to 5 months to assist a group of beneficiaries to 
draw up a business plan, which the organisation ended up undertaking itself. Another incident 
is when the agricultural extension officer was not pleased that the DRDLR sent claimants, 
during the farm evaluation process, back and forth between the two departments only to settle 
other beneficiaries on the same piece of land without informing the Department of 
Agriculture. The lack of communication brought up by the participants makes evident the 
non-alignment between state institutions involved in land reform processes founded in the 
absence of coordination between the different spheres of government (Hall et al, 2003:33). 
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Interpreted from the extension officer’s interview is that the organisations are condescending 
towards the Department of Agriculture which results in their reluctance to work together on 
the same projects. He claims that NGOs think that they know it all and actually prefer to 
work in isolation. Zama Zikhali: 
We used to attend workshops (with ECARP) but then there are some politics between some 
organisations. Or perhaps they prefer working in isolation and thinking that the skill that 
they have is better than that of other organisations.  
Furthermore, organisations being told that they are too radical means that their practices are 
not in line with those of the departments. The only actor that had an overall positive attitude 
towards other actors was DRDLR official responsible for the mentorship programme. 
Already part of a multi stake holder framework, which does not include Masifunde, he felt 
that there is no department that is able to work alone let alone without the expertise from 
agriculture and water affairs. He might be of this opinion because they really need the 
assistance as made evident by Masifunde and Department of Agriculture staff. The aid from 
different actors proves to be beneficial, as stated by Lahiff (2003).  Lahiff (2003: 43) is of the 
view that effective NGOs, with a clear vision of land reform, can intervene with various 
structures and at various points in the process to maintain momentum. Also, the maturation of 
land reform policy has been accelerated by the partnerships between government and NGOs 
which adds much-needed capacity to embattled state agencies such as the DRDLR.  
Perceptions of actors reinforce their relationships and interactions. The departments, 
especially DRDLA are seen not to be delivering accordingly by Masifunde which is why they 
are in dire need of their involvement. As mentioned above, the departments’ outlook is that 
Masifunde is too radical. Masifunde thinks they are better-equipped than the Department of 
agriculture but with the same breath say that it’s good that they (NGOs) are able to identify 
other needs people may have in aftercare (post-settlement). Reggie maintains,  
(DRDLR) took 4 -5 months for a business plan. So it shows how slow things are 
happening in government, so we need to build one (relationship) to enhance our 
resources to come together so that these limited resources will be maximised in terms 
of impact for participants that they are working with.  
 
 The reason for the proposed combination of resources is that departments have been unable 
to support communities to meet their desired outcomes on their own. The grouping of 
resources is a necessity in order to realise more achievements within land reform as it is not 
only problematic for beneficiaries but also constrains the organisation’s role in assisting with 
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the processes. The coming together of all actors involved would be the resolution to the weak 
link between consultants, professionals, managers, planners, ﬁeld staff, technicians and local 
residents who often function with a high degree of independence from one another, and their 
interactions involve negotiation and a diversity of interests (Hart, 2012:564). Lahiff (2003:9) 
is also of the same mind that there is a need to involve multiple role-players in provision of 
services to beneficiaries, in order to achieve maximum improvement in the lives of 
beneficiaries following settlement of claims. This was a pattern surfacing from the actors 
regardless of Zama Zikhali’s hesitation in working with other actors.   
 
6.7 Role played in post-settlement support by the three different actors 
 
The biggest challenge facing redistribution in the Eastern Cape includes ensuring that 
beneficiaries obtain the support necessary to enable them to secure a livelihood (Lahiff, 2003: 
27). This concern places the issue of post-settlement support in a central position. The way in 
which post-settlement support is carried out hinges on the manner in which it is framed. The 
varying post-settlement views emerged during my findings. An illustration of the variation is 
evident in land reform literature as well. On the one hand, Hart (2012:563) lists “lack of 
money and equipment; lack of skills (both technical and managerial); lack of settlement 
support; lack of legal structures” as the usual suspects resulting in the failure of land reform. 
This list seems to be an expansion of post-settlement support itself. On the other hand Hall 
(2004:220) defines it as infrastructure, extension officers, access to input including credit and 
access to markets. In addition to that, Anseeuw & Mathebula (2008:13) emphasise expertise 
knowledge (project management) and a more social one as conflict solution. As there exists 
disparities between these outlines of post-settlement support, it was so for my participants. It 
is then necessary to define post-settlement support according to each of these actors. Their 
descriptions of what it entails are not far from identical, with the exception of Masifunde 
staff. Their type of support would differ slightly due to their firm belief in land for feeding 
families read against the departments’ belief in land for generating business. The aftercare 
given by the Department of Agriculture involves evaluating the existing infrastructure for the 
type of enterprise that might be undertaken as well as providing training geared towards the 
specific enterprise. In addition, the care involves supply input and infrastructural 
development such as tractors, as well as regular monitoring. The official from DRDLR 
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accounts for this support to be empowering farmers through financial support which includes 
technical aspect, all falling within the mentorship programme. Alike for Masifunde, post-
settlement support entails ensuring beneficiaries have a business or farm plan, and are part of 
a mentoring programme by linking them to relevant institutions. The ongoing support they 
give is introducing to and continually training them in agro-ecological methods and raising 
awareness on government policies that affect them. An example of this was their involvement 
in spreading awareness on the implication of the traditional courts bill which further 
concentrated power in hands of the traditional leaders in terms of land allocation. Its 
discriminatory elements especially towards women were raised.  
According to the beneficiaries, post-settlement support differs slightly. Their differing notion 
would affect whom they view to be more involved in assisting them with aftercare between 
the three actors. Post-settlement support signifies guidance and some form of leadership. As 
Kholeka stated, 
Resources, money, one cannot work without money. Workshop, training, knowledge 
and monitoring. They should give us a mentor. 
They were in need of support in the form or resources, money, skills and knowledge but most 
importantly, monitoring through mentorship. This is in addition to being provided with a 
tractor, sand, livestock and know-how from the municipality, DRDLR and Department of 
Agriculture, University of Fort Hare and Masifunde respectively.     
 
Both Department of Agriculture and Masifunde also engage in conflict solution on farms 
between beneficiaries. The extension officer even went to call themselves agricultural social 
workers. In addition to resolving disputes, Masifunde provides access to resources 
beneficiaries would not be exposed to if it were not for their involvement. Access to lawyers, 
as in the case of a group of claimants who have only received 5 out of the 33 farms for which 
they applied. Capacity building is another important aspect as it empowers the people, which 
forms part of their mandate. How this is done is by teaching them to manage their own books, 
use the land productively and be able to document their crops. Then making it clear that 
Masifunde’s methods of post-settlement support reinforce their argument for small scale 
farming for ones needs and not for profit.        
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6.8 Masifunde’s Role in land reform and post-settlement support overall  
Despite having played a role in applying pressure for land reform after Apartheid, many 
NGOs have lost much of their unique standing (Lahiff, 2003:45). Additionally, now that land 
reform was introduced, its failures were attributed to lack of post-settlement support, lack of 
money and equipment and lack of appropriate legal structures (Hart, 2012:563). Masifunde 
attempts to combat the deficiencies existing in the land reform programme by providing 
workshops on alternative farming methods and by supplying know-how (land use and 
awareness). However, empowerment in their own way is still limited. They do provide a link 
with relevant institutions, however, what takes place thereafter is beyond their control. 
Beneficiaries are equipped with skills and knowledge to work their farms appropriately to 
them which is in this case small-scale farming. What help is it if claimants are occupying and 
making use of land that is not in their ownership. There are instances of crime on the farms as 
a result of slow pace of handing over land. As an organisation it is unable to resolve this as it 
is government that should be accountable for this occurrence. Ultimately, title deeds, proof of 
true ownership is dependent on the DRDLR. Subsequently, as much assistance Masifunde 
may provide, its effectiveness tends to be diminished by the bottleneck of the departments 
involved. Low levels of post-settlement include inappropriate planning by officials and 
consultants (O’laughlin, 2012:9), these are restrictions stemming from the departments 
affecting the organisation’s impact. Scope within which to work is further made difficult by 
issues such as beneficiaries in need of mentorship more than ten years after having occupied 
the land. In the event that the organisation should intervene, the onus is on the relevant 
department and not Masifunde to guarantee this. In spite of the small space within which it is 
forced to operate (due to unequal ‘powers’), the organisation’s efforts may be commended.  
Additionally, other factors affecting the impact of their role are policy changes within land 
reform, as observed by Reggie Waldick.  
Biggest mistake is that one minister comes in with a new policy as if it’s not the same 
political party. “Use it or lose it”, JZ (Jacob Zuma) kicked her out then he brought in 
Gugi (Gugile Nkwinti) who introduced PLAS. That is the general problem, there is no 
consistency. Can’t just change cause need to see if it’s working or not. 5 years is not 
enough to see if it’s working or not, must be 10- 15 years to say it’s working or not. 
Like they did with OBE in education.  
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An illustration of this is the shift from LRAD to PLAS. Unlike PLAS, LRAD resulted in land 
ownership despite profitability and was more open to large group applications. Within the 
new approach, their efforts might prove futile in the long run, especially since the 
organisation is not in favour of large-scale farming, and the policy doesn’t immediately 
translate into change of ownership.  
Assessing the role played by Masifunde as an NGO can be said to centre on sustainability and 
partnerships. As previously mentioned, land reform rooted in SLA means that successful 
transfer of land is meant to improve the standards of living in a sustainable manner. It may be 
said then that sustainability is a measure of success for land reform. Van Haren &Van Driel 
(2003:535) state that civil society has been attributed with a critical role of involving citizens 
in development having an indication that without their active involvement and participation 
of civil society, policies and strategies are likely to fail in their objectives. Adams (2001:1) is 
of the same mind that NGOs have accepted being the biggest contributors to the development 
process by government and official agencies. The equating of civil society’s involvement 
with success is unsubstantiated. Therefore it can be said that in order to explore the role of an 
NGO, what needs to be assessed is its impact which again is pivotal to sustainability, 
sustainability of the project.     
The difficulty in assessing the impact NGOs have within a community is the lack of 
measurements or standards. What entails the impact of the effectiveness of a project within a 
specified community apart from reaching its objectives are questions that need to be asked. 
Simply meeting objectives does not translate in the true effectiveness and sustainability of a 
project because it cannot be assumed that NGOs only engage in projects with sustainable 
effects. In Sarriot et al (2004: 9) sustainability is what makes a project truly effective but 
what becomes problematic is the NGO outlining how or in what ways to ensure the work they 
are carrying out is sustainable. Additionally, assessing the impact the NGO has within a 
community is also problematic. Impact assessment should not be confused with project 
evaluation which is the description of activities carried out rather than any analysis of the 
relevance of what had been done (Adams, 2001: 2). Capacity building is seen to ensure the 
result of sustainability, which I am in agreement with due to the fact that the individual is 
given the capabilities to sustain the outcomes of the project long after the organisation has 
left or withdrawn their assistance. However, capacity building does not equip NGOs to assess 
impact. Sustainability is when helping a community and being able to help address other 
concerns apart from the ones currently working on.  
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Kruse et al (1997) cited in Adams (2001:2) is of the view that there is a lack of firm and 
reliable evidence on the impact of NGO development projects and programs. While this may 
be partially true, what is not taken into consideration is the impact within the community 
which I have already mentioned cannot be quantified or circumscribed. The only manner in 
which to assess impact in my understanding is to compare the standard of living of the 
community prior to the project and thereafter. This would be an indication of the relevance of 
work done. With that said, it is challenging to assess what an impact Masifunde has had and 
continually has within the communities it works. The projects it works on according to the 
SLA are meant to be sustainable as they are designed to improve their livelihoods. However 
the existing challenges in land reform program impede what would be an even wider impact 
of the organisation. Sarriot et al (2004:10) argues that improving sustainability is a critical 
determinate of true impact. Furthermore, in order to achieve sustainable results working 
through partnerships and capacity –building is a requirement. Two of my respondents, Reggie 
and Siyabonga spoke of partnerships in order to better reach their desired outcomes and 
mentioned how the organisation works to build capabilities within rural societies. These 
responses are not in correlation with Sarriot’s (2004) argument on partnerships and capacity 
building. According to this previously mentioned author, sustainability has been reduced and 
viewed in a linear manner. It is outlined as an outcome requiring specific inputs. In reality, 
issues of post-settlement support demonstrate that this simplistic view of sustainability is 
invalid. Including Sarriot’s (2004) sustainability notion equating to true impact has 
implications for Masifunde as an organisation. It suggests that the work Masifunde carries out 
should be sustainable and by virtue have a real impact for the communities. This is due to the 
fact that they are in partnerships and engage in capacity building. However, studies show that 
land beneficiaries experience numerous problems such as accessing services such as credit, 
training , extension advice, transport and ploughing services and access to input and produce 
markets (Hall, 2004; Wegerif, 2004). Keeping that in mind, these are the obstacles to 
sustainable results and therefore would direct in the conclusion of the organisation not having 
any true impact according to Sarriot’s (2004) outline.   
Supplementary to the narrow criteria with which to judge or determine impact, is the widely 
accepted view of civil society as a black box requiring inputs with specific outputs (Van 
Haren &Van Driel, 2005: 531). Civil society is associated with ideal partnerships which in 
line with Sarriot et al (2004) would translate into sustainable projects. Brinkeroff (1999: 142) 
is of the same mind with the argument that state-civil society networks can facilitate 
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increased citizen participation in public affairs, empowerment of local groups to take charge 
of their livelihoods.  
 
Civil society groups are met with high and often unrealistic expectations. In entering 
partnerships they are exposing themselves to unequal power relations in interacting with 
specific actors such as governmental departments; which I argued earlier in the second 
chapter to not be based on equality. Then the organisations are meant to transparently work in 
the interests of those they claim to represent, forgetting that they are open to influential 
external factors. Additionally, their work is now being met with sustainability and impact 
measures. Organisations such as Masifunde continuously play a role, a significant role at that, 
for land beneficiaries and claimants. The impact they have had cannot be calculated in terms 
of anyone’s definition and outlines of sustainability and impact which is why I have chosen 
to explore their role within land reform processes. With the inclusion of partnerships or not, 
they are able to engage with rural communities in ways they know best. In spite of setbacks 
in the form of post-settlement support their work aims to capacitate land beneficiaries which 
empowers them to better their livelihoods.     
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CHAPTER 7 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
The main goal is to explore the role of the Masifunde non-governmental organisation in land 
reform and post-settlement support in the Albany district of the Eastern Cape. 
Related sub-goals are: 
I. Exploring the nature of the relationship between civil society organisations 
such as Masifunde and the Department of Rural Development and Land 
Affairs;  
II. Exploring the perceptions of land reform claimants, Masifunde staff and the 
staff of the DRDLA with regard to the role of NGOs in the implementation of 
land reform in South Africa. 
Moyo (1999) in Mngxitama (2006:60) points out that the involvement of NGOs in land issues 
in Southern Africa is limited. This is a generalisation, with minimal applicability. It fails to 
further explicate what involvement entails, is it a riot or assistance? Additionally, the scope of 
land issues varies widely. Moyo’s statement needs to be looked at within a specific context. 
Narrowing down the scope from Southern to South Africa, he is correct in saying so, 
however influential factors such as the organisation’s relationship with the state and in this 
case, the history of NGOs within the land sector. This thesis unravelled the above statement. 
How much existing space is available for involvement of NGOs? Historically, involvement 
was increasingly limited yet its presence was visible. Currently with less repressive methods, 
their involvement seems to have waned. However, Masifunde demonstrates that NGOs 
actually are actively involved in land issues in various ways such as advocacy, capacity-
building for rural people and actively protesting alongside disgruntled rural land claimants. 
Having said that, the work they do or wish to undertake is largely affected by the incapability 
of relevant departments such as the Department of Agriculture and DRDLR.  
Gummeson (1991) in Miles & Huberman (1994:80) reports that managers and consultants 
often rely on qualitative studies. With land reform being such a pressing issue since its 
inception since 1994, the reality is that it will continually undergo changes. This study has 
identified challenges that land claimants and beneficiaries face in the process of land 
acquisition and post-transfer, therefore it is able to contribute to the already existing 
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literature. In terms of development and change, the evidence of this research shows that a 
larger-scale study spanning across time and space may be necessary in order to be more 
general, as this one is too specific. Forming part of the recommendations is the idea that 
relevant departments and institutions may foster permanent equal partnerships, not where 
NGOs patch up gaps left behind by the government. What that would be required is for the 
NGOs to situate themselves , not as an entity claiming to represent the people, yet be held 
accountable when government fails to deliver as the landless are increasingly getting 
frustrated with being spoken for, resulting in misrepresentation.      
7.2 Recommendations for future research   
Future studies may focus on uncovering the extent to which Masifunde has capacity in 
assisting in land reform as they could be restricted by their budget. In-depth research should 
also be conducted on perceptions of actors involved in the land reform process and perhaps in 
a comparative analysis between successful and unsuccessful projects. There has been 
abundant research done on the failure of land reform policies and the reasons behind this 
failure. What could be more useful is to understand what informs the policy formulation 
during policy changes, to prevent further ineffective policies in future. What would prove to 
be of interest and at the same time contribute to civil society literature is an understanding or 
analysis of relationships and interactions of NGOs, social movements and grass movements 
found in the land sector, separate from external actors like the state and the public. This 
would unveil a glimpse into what seems to be glossed over the romanticized notion of NGO 
relations with one another. The last recommendation is for a more in-depth comparative 
analysis over longer period making use of more data collection methods like focus groups 
looking at the role of NGOs, to take into account variables that inhibit or enhance their role. 
What actors, if any restrict or expand their role over two different time periods.    
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